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Abstract 
This thesis commences with an exploration of the ethics of whistleblowing as traditionally 
understood, describing the ethical dilemma at its centre: remaining loyal to one‟s 
organisation, against alerting society to organisational wrongdoing that threatens its welfare. 
The positions on several problematic issues in the literature, such as dissent, organisational 
retaliation, whistleblower motive, and mandatory whistleblowing will be presented and 
evaluated. The key internal/external disclosure dichotomy within whistleblowing will also be 
critically examined. The purported solutions to these issues, as well as whistleblowing‟s 
central dilemma, will be shown to remain unsatisfactory. This will be attributed to the 
adoption of an Enlightenment rules-based approach to ethics in general, which underpins and 
informs the ethics of whistleblowing in particular. An Enlightenment rules-based approach 
seeks to posit universal and immutable ethical standards that transcend context. 
As corrective to the above failings, the ethics of whistleblowing will be investigated from the 
view that seeks to understand whistleblowing as a historically determined and culturally 
mediated social practice. Within the contexts of the USA and South Africa it will be 
demonstrated that key whistleblowing issues (and even the central whistleblowing dilemma 
of divided loyalties) cannot be cast in immutable and universal terms, and are influenced by 
the contingencies that accompany them. An attempt will then be made to understand 
whistleblowing in the context of the globalisation of the last thirty years, which will prove 
more difficult. This will be undertaken through an analysis of Vandekerckhove‟s project, 
which seeks to place the normative legitimisations of whistleblowing legislation and 
organisational whistleblowing policies within a globalisation semantic able to contain the 
conflict between society and the organisation.  This will be shown as ill-conceived because of 
Vandekerckhove‟s particular understanding of the organisation as an operationally closed 
system. 
Moving the argument forward will be undertaken at the hand of Critical Complexity theory 
which attempts to make the case for understanding the organisation as an open system. This 
will allow us to recast corporate responsibility as relational responsiveness to a particular 
stakeholder, which in turn will allow flexibility in terms of who qualifies as a recipient of a 
disclosure of wrongdoing. Consequently the internal/external disclosure dichotomy will be 
proved unsustainable. Further opening up the organisation will render the boundary with 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
society meaningless, as it will be shown that the identity of society and organisation are 
inextricably tied together. As such, the notion of society versus the organisation will 
disappear, and whistleblowing will be reconceptualised as loyalty to both society and the 
organisation simultaneously, thus rendering the central dilemma of whistleblowing obsolete. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie tesis begin met „n studie van die etiese kwessies rakende fluitjieblasers  soos dit 
tradisioneel verstaan word, en beskryf die sentrale etiese dilemma – om lojaal te bly tot die 
organisasie, teenoor om die gemeenskap in te lig oor die organisatoriese oortredings wat die 
welvaart van die gemeenskap bedreig. Die verskillende menings ten opsigte van verskeie 
problematiese kwessies in die literatuur soos verdeeldheid, organisatoriese vergelding, motief 
van die fluitjieblaser en verpligte fluitjieblaas sal aangebied en gëevalueer word. Die hoof 
vraag of „n openbaring van informasie wat binne of buite die organisasie gebeur as 
fluitjieblaas beskou kan word, word ook krities ondersoek. Die voorgestelde oplossings tot 
hierdie kwessies, sowel as die fluitjieblaser se kerndilemma, is onbevredigend en sal dus 
onderskryf word deur die aanvaarding van „n  reëls-gebaseerde Verligtingsbenadering tot 
etiek in die algemeen, wat deur die etiek van fluitjieblaas spesifiek, ondersteun en ingelig 
word. „n Reëls-gebaseerde Verligtingsbenadering poog om universele en onveranderlike 
etiese standaarde, wat konteks oorbrug, te postuleer. 
As korreksies tot die bogenoemde tekortkominge, sal die etiek van fluitjieblaas ondersoek 
word vanuit „n benadering wat poog om fluitjieblaas as „n histories bepaalde en versoenbare 
sosiale praktyk te verstaan. Binne die konteks van die VSA en Suid-Afrika, sal dit 
gedemonstreer word dat sleutel fluitjieblaas kwessies, en selfs die sentrale fluitjieblaas 
dilemma van verdeelde lojaliteit, nie binne onveranderlike en universele terme gegroepeer 
kan word nie, en dat hierdie kwessies beïnvloed word deur die gebeurlikhede wat daarmee 
gepaard gaan. „n Poging sal aangewend word om fluitjieblaas binne die konteks van 
globalisering in die afgelope 30 jaar te verstaan, wat meer kompleks sal wees. Dit sal gedoen 
word deur „n analise van Vandekerckhove se projek, wat poog om die normatiewe 
legitimering van fluitjieblaas wetgewing en organisatoriese fluitjieblaas beleide in „n globale 
semantiek te plaas, ten einde om die konflik tussen die gemeenskap en die organisasie te 
verminder. Dit sal bewys word dat hierdie projek nie deurdag is nie, as gevolg van 
Vandekerckhove se bepaalde begrip van organisasies as „n operasionele geslote sisteem. 
Die argument sal verder onderskryf word aan die hand van die Kritiese Kompleksiteitsteorie, 
wat die organisasie as „n oop sisteem beskryf. Dit sal ons toelaat om korporatiewe 
verantwoordelikheid as „n reaksie in „n verhouding met „n spesifieke belanghebbende te 
beskryf, wat weer op sy beurt ons sal toelaat om buigsaam te wees in die kwalifisering van 
wie as „n ontvanger van „n onthulling van oortredings geïdentifiseer moet word. Gevolglik sal 
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die onderskeid tussen „n interne en eksterne openbaring van informasie as onvolhoubaar 
bewys word. As die organisasie oper gemaak word, sal dit die grens met die gemeenskap 
betekenisloos maak, omdat, soos bewys sal word, die identiteit van die organisasie en 
gemeenskap onlosmaaklik vas is aan mekaar. So sal die konsep van gemeenskap  teenoor die 
organisasie verdwyn, en sal fluitjieblaas  geherkonsepsualiseer word as gelyktydige lojaliteit 
tot beide die gemeenskap en die organisasie, wat die sentrale dilemma van fluitjieblaas sal 
uitskakel.  
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Introduction  
1.  The whistleblower as pariah: setting the context 
Even during whistleblowing‟s finest hour, when Time magazine, in 2002, named three 
whistleblowers as their persons of the year, following the corporate governance scandals of 
the early 2000s in corporate America, exemplified by the spectacular financial implosion of 
Enron, the ambivalent attitudes associated with whistleblowing were hard to overcome. In an 
interview conducted with the three whistleblowers - Cynthia Cooper, Coleen Rowley, and 
Sherron Watkins - both Cooper and Rowley stated that they hated the term „whistleblower‟; 
Cooper said it was too much like „tattletale‟ (Layco and Ripley 2002).  Those ambivalent 
attitudes are also evidenced in the titles of papers in the academic literature: „The 
Whistleblower: Patriot or Bounty Hunter?‟ (Singer 1992); „Whistleblowers: Saint or Snitch?‟ 
(Anonymous 1992); „Whistleblowers: Heroes or Stool Pigeons?‟ (Fiesta 1990); 
„Whistleblowing: Subversion or Corporate Citizenship?‟ (Johnson 1996).  
The ambivalence whistleblowing provokes stems from the central dilemma of divided 
loyalties at the heart of the ethics of whistleblowing. On the one side are those who argue that 
employees owe their allegiance, first and foremost, to the organisation which provides them 
with a livelihood. Ravishankar (2003) mentions an arbitrator, in a case from 1972, whose 
rebuke sums up this sentiment, “you cannot bite the hand that feeds you and insist on staying 
on for the banquet.” In other words, whistleblowing is an act of disloyalty against the 
organisation. Whistleblowers then are rightly regarded as pariahs. A pariah can be defined as 
a social outcast; in blowing the whistle the whistleblower is cast out from the organisation in 
order that the organisation retains its prerogative to define its actions.   Furthermore, the 
implication is that the whistleblower should expect that this act of disloyalty will result in 
being expelled from the organisation; or worse.  Some have gone further in their criticism of 
whistleblowing, arguing that it undermines the very basis of Capitalism. In a now infamous 
quote James Roche (1971), then chairman of the board of General Motors, stated that: 
Some critics are now busy eroding another support of free enterprise - the loyalty of a 
management team, with its unifying values of cooperative work. Some of the enemies 
of business now encourage an employee to be disloyal to the enterprise. They want to 
create suspicion and disharmony, and pry into the propriety interests of the business. 
However this is labelled - industrial espionage, whistleblowing, or professional 
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responsibility - it is another tactic for spreading disunity and creating conflict (Roche 
1971, in Clark 1997: 1071). 
On the other side of the whistleblowing dilemma of divided loyalties are those who argue that 
the public interest overrides the interests of the organisation, and that when organisational 
wrongdoing threatens harm to society then whistleblowing is justified; even an act that 
should be encouraged. The problem is that even when whistleblowing is justified the 
organisation retaliates against the whistleblower. This reflexive action can be traced back to 
the organisational belief that “their outfits would have quietly righted all wrongs if only they 
had been given time” (Layco and Ripley 2002: 2). The Enron debacle disproved this cynical 
hope - given more time, those responsible did not try to right their wrongs, but instead 
hastened their looting of the organisation, speeding up its demise.  
Society has come to recognise that in order to expect the whistleblower‟s warning, it must 
offer it its protection. To that end, legislation which aims to protect the whistleblower against 
organisational retaliation has been enacted around the world. Whistleblowing has become 
institutionalised, set down in official organisational whistleblowing policies (created in 
response to that legislation.) These lay out the procedures a would-be whistleblower must 
follow in making a disclosure, and the conditions which allow a whistleblower to claim 
protection against retaliation:  his/her motives in disclosing must be moral, s/he must be able 
to produce sufficient evidence of wrongdoing, s/he must disclose to a particular person; if not 
the disclosure is unethical and does not qualify as a protected disclosure. As Alford (2001: 
112) remarks, “in the realm of whistleblower protection, procedure is king.”   
This insistence on procedure undermines the hope that institutionalising whistleblowing will 
be able to eliminate the conflict between organisation and society. Alford (133) continues, 
“Whistleblowers lift the veil for a moment. Instead of looking at what lies behind the veil, we 
gaze at the one who lifts it … in this way perpetuate the problem … transforming 
whistleblowing into deviance.” In other words, if the institutionalisation of whistleblowing 
focuses primarily on the whistleblower and not the organisation, specifically the organisation 
in society, then the whistleblower will continue to be seen as a pariah.  
One of the key aspects of whistleblowing procedure is to specify who is eligible as a recipient 
of a disclosure of wrongdoing. Internal disclosure is a disclosure made to a person, or group 
of persons, who are deemed part of the organisation; external disclosure is a disclosure made 
to a person, or group of persons, who are deemed not to be part of the organisation. This 
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internal/external dichotomy mirrors, at a procedural level, the central dilemma within the 
ethics of whistleblowing: internal disclosure is seen as an act of loyalty to the organisation, 
while external disclosure amounts to putting the public interest first. The former allows the 
organisation to right its wrongs before being subjected to the scrutiny of the public. External 
disclosure amounts to a declaration that the public interest is so vitally threatened that any 
delay in making that information known is inexcusable, even if that haste is to the detriment 
of the organisation.  
The internal/external disclosure dichotomy is however, problematic. Where does one locate 
the boundary of the organisation? Who decides who is part of the organisation and who not, 
and as such who is privy to information that may affect his/her interests? The whistleblower 
who discloses „externally‟ is thus a “boundary violator” (99), “someone from the inside 
[who] represents the interests of the outside” (129). What this organisational fear - of having 
its boundaries violated - represents, is the more general organisational distrust of dissent: if 
we do not all agree on which corporate activities constitute a public harm, or do not all agree 
that a particular stakeholder forms part of the organisation such that it can be the recipient of 
a disclosure, then the organisation will lose its identity and purpose. Thus,  “… the 
whistleblower does not necessarily need to go public to get into trouble because once he 
mentions his or her concerns he or she already is the public inside the organisation”(130). In 
other words, from the perspective of the organisation, what is of more concern than whether 
the would-be whistleblower discloses information concerning wrongdoing internally or 
externally, is that the would-be whistleblower describes a particular corporate act as 
wrongdoing in the first place.    
2. Conceptualising the whistleblower as parrhesiastes: goals of the thesis 
One of the goals of this thesis is to reconceptualise whistleblowing such that dissent, which 
some theorists (Jubb 1999, Bok 1980) argue is fundamental to the notion of whistleblowing, 
can be accommodated within the organisation. Accommodating dissent will be explored 
under the notion of „normative congruence‟. If the attempt to accommodate dissent proves 
successful then we will be on our way to dispelling the notion of whistleblowing as an act of 
organisational disloyalty. In the process we will come to “provide a legitimate - if dangerous 
- social identity for the person who speaks fearlessly” (Jones et al.2005: 120). Providing a 
legitimate social identity for the whistleblower constitutes another goal of this thesis: to 
reconceptualise the identity of the whistleblower from a pariah to a parrhesiastes.  The 
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ancient Greek parrhesiastes was one who spoke fearlessly - a truth-teller regardless of the 
consequences. This reconceptualisation of the whistleblower seeks to acknowledge the 
political dimension inherent in the whistleblowing act - an act which seeks to change the way 
the organisation conducts itself, and more importantly the way the organisation understands 
its place in society.  
The identity of the whistleblower as parrhesiastes will be tied to the identity of the 
organisation, understood as an open system. The organisation as an open system will see the 
boundaries of the organisation as flexible and the strict demarcation between the organisation 
and the stakeholders in its environment as no longer possible. The central premise of this 
thesis is that if we can understand the organisation as an open system then the 
internal/external disclosure dichotomy is void.  
The central challenge then is to make a viable case for understanding the organisation as an 
open system. This will be undertaken at the hand of Critical Complexity theory. Critical 
Complexity will allow us to conceive of the boundaries of the organisation in a new way: as 
fluid, not fixed, open to it‟s environment. The nature of corporate identity that will emerge 
from our understanding of organisations as complex, open systems will have profound 
implications for our notions of corporate responsibility. Corporate responsibility will be 
recast as „relational responsiveness‟. This relational responsiveness - toward a stakeholder 
who may be affected by a corporate action - will facilitate the process of making the 
organisation‟s boundaries flexible, in particular with reference to the distinction between 
internal and external disclosure.    
It will also be argued that Critical Complexity allows us to reframe the boundaries between 
organisation and society. Such a reframing, which seeks to understand the identity of society 
and the organisation as coterminous - (i.e. the identities arise and die together) allows us to 
achieve this thesis‟ central goal - to dissolve the central whistleblowing dilemma of 
conflicting loyalties. If the identity of society and the organisation are coterminous then there 
can be no society versus organisation. This thesis‟ central claim, then, is that Critical 
Complexity, in opening up the boundaries of the organisation, allows us to understand the 
whistleblowing act as an act of loyalty to both the organisation and to society simultaneously.  
Facilitating the process of reframing the boundaries between the organisation and society is 
an understanding of „ethics as practice‟. Ethics as practice eschews a rules-based approach to 
moral problem solving and “remain[s] fully engaged with the concrete contingencies and 
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dynamics of the world” (Painter-Morland 2008: 87). A rules-based approach finds its 
grounding in the ideals of the Enlightenment. Ethical theories grounded in the Enlightenment 
seek to posit universal and immutable ethical principles to guide moral action. Enlightenment 
theories also posit a moral agent capable of transcending his/her circumstances to make a 
rational and objective moral decision. It will be shown that such Enlightenment ethical 
theories fail to satisfactorily address ethical dilemmas in general, and the whistleblowing 
dilemma in particular. Moving toward a more acceptable ethics of whistleblowing then 
entails a sensitivity to context, and to understanding whistleblowing  “… as an historically 
determined, institutionally shaped, culturally mediated social practice”,  which is “constituted 
in and through the social order that generates them, the discourses that articulate them and the 
subject positions which realize them” (Perry 1998: 239).  This thesis will thus advocate 
abandoning Enlightenment ethical theories, such as Kantianism and Utilitarianism, and 
adopting an ethics of whistleblowing that incorporates Perry‟s and Painter-Morland‟s 
insights.  
A further failure of Enlightenment ethical theories to satisfactorily deal with the   
internal/external disclosure dichotomy, or the whistleblowing dilemma of divided loyalties, 
can be attributed to their particular understanding of moral agency. Enlightenment ethical 
theories assume that a direct causal relationship can be established between a moral agent and 
a resultant action. This assumption, in the context of whistleblowing, means that a direct 
causal relationship between an act of corporate wrongdoing and a particular employee, or 
group of employees can be established, and thus someone, or some corporate policy or 
procedure, can be held responsible. Again, Critical Complexity will allow us to disregard 
such fallacious assumptions and posit an alternative notion of moral agency that supports this 
thesis‟ central goal. 
3. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis proceeds in three parts. In chapter 1, we unpack the standard notions of the ethics 
of whistleblowing. We start by considering how to define whistleblowing, choosing to adopt 
Jubb‟s (1999) formulation, which neatly distills whistleblowing into six essential elements: 
action; outcome; actor; subject; target and recipient.  We then examine how organisational 
loyalty has been conceptualised in the literature and juxtapose this with accounts of dissent 
within the organisation. Between these two poles, we then put forward the opposing cases for 
internal or external disclosure. Next we investigate how the organisation retaliates against the 
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whistleblower, reviewing the strategies it employs to isolate and eventually dismiss the 
whistleblower. Completing that review is an exploration of whistleblower motive, which 
becomes even harder to fathom in light of those retaliation strategies. It is at this juncture that 
this thesis‟ problem statement (or rather the first component of this thesis‟ problem 
statement) starts to take shape - the understanding and critique of whistleblowing as “the 
manifestation of prior ontological certainties or universal truths” (Perry 1998: 239).  
The section which follows serves to sharpen the outlines of that problem statement, dealing 
with the conditions under which whistleblowing should be seen as obligatory, as opposed to 
permissible. The problem is that by making whistleblowing a duty the organisation in effect 
shifts its corporate responsibilities on to its employees. That shift is tied to standard universal 
truths concerning wrongdoing, which posit a direct line of causation between agent and 
outcome. In the last section of chapter 1 we make the implicit political dimensions of 
whistleblowing explicit, exploring some of the issues involved in the politics of 
whistleblowing, such as workplace free speech as human right. It will be argued that in the 
final analysis, the politics of whistleblowing prove to be inseparable from the ethics of 
whistleblowing. Chapter 1 concludes by outlining, what was identified above as, one of this 
thesis‟ goals - providing a legitimate social identity for the whistleblower. We delineate the 
identity of the parrhesiastes and postulate that identity as a way to reconceptualise the 
whistleblower. 
Chapter 2 begins by developing further the first component of the problem statement - 
rooting the aporia of whistleblowing within the context of The Enlightenment. The 
Enlightenment ideal, guided by Reason, is elucidated upon and found wanting, particularly in 
relation to the ethics of whistleblowing. As an alternative to that unsuccessful approach, we 
then follow Perry‟s (1998) strategy of understanding whistleblowing as a “historically 
determined, institutionally shaped, culturally mediated social practice.” We put Perry‟s thesis 
to the test by examining whistleblowing within the social and historical contexts of the USA 
and South Africa.  It will be shown that those countries‟ unique histories and cultures produce 
different conceptualisations of organisational loyalty, for example, and thus produce 
divergent strategies to justify, protect and encourage whistleblowing. Thereafter, we trace the 
evolution of the ethics of whistleblowing within the historical context of the globalisation of 
the last thirty years. In particular, we examine the shifts in the normative legitimisations of 
whistleblowing legislation and organisational whistleblowing policies, which have sought to 
eliminate the conflict between society and the organisation (manifesting itself as the central 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
whistleblowing dilemma of organisational loyalty versus societal welfare) but containing that 
conflict within the organisation or a proxy of society, such as a regulator or Ombudsperson. 
That examination focuses on Vandekerckhove‟s (2006) Organisational Social Responsibility 
(OSR) legitimisation which is grounded in his „globalisation semantic‟. A central concept of 
that globalisation semantic is Vandekerckhove‟s „network perspective‟ which understands 
organisations as autopoietic systems, i.e. operationally closed systems, forming and shaping 
themselves on their own, at a distance from society. It is here that the second, major 
component of the problem statement emerges: organisations understood as closed systems 
cannot eliminate the conflict between society and organisation because organisations as 
closed systems cannot resolve the internal/external disclosure dichotomy.  
Chapter 3 aims to make the case for understanding organisations as open systems. To this end 
chapter 3 commences with an exegesis of Critical Complexity theory. We examine the 
characteristics of a complex system and the features (such as emergence and self-
organisation) which follow from those characteristics. We explore in depth the notion of the 
boundaries of a complex system, which cannot be definitively demarcated with its 
environment. Furthermore, the boundaries of a complex system don‟t just separate, but also 
enable that which is bounded. Boundaries do not a priori distinguish one complex system 
from another, but are the result of a framing strategy. Choosing a framing strategy involves a 
normative choice which precipitates an ethics of Critical Complexity: we will always leave 
something out in choosing one framing strategy over another, and, as such, our knowledge of 
complex systems - which includes where to draw its boundaries - will always be provisional. 
The next step in the argument will be to show how organisations can be understood as 
complex systems.  Identity formation in the organisation, it will be argued, occurs through 
complex processes such as „normative congruence‟ - a process which allows the organisation 
to maintain its identity while accommodating dissent. This manner of accommodating dissent 
allows us to achieve another of the goals of this thesis which, as stated above, was to show 
that whistleblowing is not an act of organisational disloyalty.  A reconceptualisation of 
corporate responsibility as „relational responsiveness‟ will follow from such a complex 
understanding of corporate identity. Relational responsiveness facilitates in bounding the 
organisation‟s identity and purpose, and allows the boundaries of the organisation to remain 
open and flexible to its stakeholder set. Therefore who qualifies as a recipient of a disclosure 
of wrongdoing is also flexible, dependant on what response is required to a particular 
stakeholder. The internal/external disclosure dichotomy is thus shown to be unsustainable, 
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which, as stated above, is the central goal of this thesis. The chapter concludes by extending 
this analysis to dissolve the boundaries between the organisation and society whose identities 
are argued to be coterminous. The organisation as an open system, constituted as it is by its 
normative processes, then views ethics as practice. Finally it is argued that the employee who 
similarly integrates ethics into his/her corporate identity then becomes the whistleblower-as-
parrhesiastes: s/he becomes the ethical boundary of the organisation. The whistleblower-as-
parrhesiastes thus conceived, gives substance to the identity first postulated at the end of 
chapter 1, and completes, as was one of the goals of this thesis, the reconceptualisation of the 
whistleblower.  
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Chapter 1:  Unpacking whistleblowing 
 
1. Introduction 
Sticking your neck out, breaking ranks, standing up for your beliefs,  speaking truth to power, 
protecting the public, betraying the team, etc. are all pejoratives bandied about when the topic 
of whistleblowing is raised. How to characterise the polarising act is, as they say, all a matter 
of perception. Whether whistleblowing should be lauded or lamented depends, say Jones, 
Parker & Ten Bos (2005:12) on who you want to win the game.  The plethora of purported 
definitions offered to capture the essence of whistleblowing deepen, rather than mitigate the 
ambiguity at its centre. Classically, whistleblowing is framed as a dilemma - is loyalty owed 
to the organisation or society first? Does one buy into management‟s explanations that 
although its style of play is rough, it is within the confines of the rules; or does one appeal to 
the third umpire of society who will more thoroughly scrutinise the encounter and decide to 
call it a foul? Reporting design flaws and production snags, closing loopholes and identifying 
inefficiencies, curbing waste and reducing costs, are all part and parcel of the everyday work 
routine. We bring these to management‟s attention and expect that part of management‟s 
function is to solve these problems that are sometimes visible only from the shop floor. 
Raising concerns is giving feedback that allows the corporation to deliver better service and 
better products. Most feel that their responsibility is now discharged and although they may 
fret when management takes no further action, they leave the matter there. Society, however, 
depends on the matter not being left there for its welfare. 
Society needs someone to persist, to seek not only a sympathetic ear but also an authoritative 
ally with the power to stop harmful misconduct. The whistleblower might try to enlist such an 
ally from within, but if none is forthcoming s/he needs to go outside the organisation. The 
organisation, perceiving such course as betrayal responds as to an enemy, attempting to not 
just deprive the whistleblower of his/her livelihood but also to eviscerate his/her social 
identity, leaving only the shell of a pariah behind. Fortunately, society has recognised that in 
order to expect the whistleblower‟s warning, it must offer it its protection. To that end it has 
enacted legislation, and in so doing made whistleblowing policies de rigueur in corporate 
codes of conduct. The unintended consequences of these developments however, risk turning 
the whistleblower into another corporate instrument by implicitly transforming 
whistleblowing into a duty.  
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This chapter follows this evolution of the whistleblower, from pariah to automaton, 
culminating in a proposed new identity – the parrhesiastes, or truth-teller. The chapter starts 
by interrogating one definition of whistleblowing which neatly encapsulates the essential 
elements constitutive of the act, serving as a launching pad into mapping the controversies 
within the literature. Section 3 then examines the various interpretations offered of loyalty 
which is contrasted with dissent. How loyalty and dissent are conceptualised also have a 
direct bearing on whether internal or external disclosure suffices as whistleblowing. Section 4 
investigates both how the organisation retaliates against the whistleblower, and what 
motivates the whistleblower to act in spite of such retaliation. At this point we briefly 
consider the ethical theories underlying the issues within whistleblowing, which in the 
instance of Kantianism and Utilitarian, are part of a much larger normative ideal - the 
Enlightenment ideal. The Enlightenment ideal, which is critically explored only in chapter 2, 
amounts to a rules-based approach to ethics - a hope to legislate a set of rules that will apply 
to all instances of whistleblowing for all time, regardless of the specifics and nuances that 
may present themselves in any particular situation. Section 5 discusses the ethical risks in 
making whistleblowing mandatory, and the dynamics and effects of whistleblowing policies 
within organisations. Section 6 makes the implicit political dimensions of whistleblowing 
explicit, and then outlines the parameters for an alternative conceptualisation of 
whistleblowing.  
2. Defining whistleblowing 
The research on whistleblowing covers diverse aspects - psychological, social, legal, cultural, 
conceptual and ethical (Vandekerckhove 2008: 107). Consequently, definitions of 
whistleblowing abound in the literature. One concise definition of whistleblowing is offered 
by Rothschild and Miethe (1994: 254): “The disclosure of illegal, unethical, or harmful 
practices in the workplace to parties who might take action.”   
 Another, more restrictive definition, is argued for by Peter Jubb (1999: 83) who defines 
whistleblowing as:  
A deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto the public record and is 
made by a person who has or had privileged access to data or information of an 
organization, about non-trivial illegality or other wrongdoing whether actual, 
suspected or anticipated which implicates and is under the control of that 
organization, to an external entity having the potential to rectify the wrongdoing.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
Jubb‟s definition of whistleblowing will be used in this thesis for several reasons: it aims to 
give the definition of whistleblowing “… a generality appropriate for ordinary speech” as “it 
is constructed from an exclusively ethical perspective” (81) (Emphasis added). Furthermore, 
his definition is a synthesis of seven other prominent definitions of whistleblowing, (84) 
whose selection aims to be representative and “he points out the different purposes and 
disciplinary focus the selected definitions were intended to suit” (Vandekerckhove 2006:22). 
Finally, the structure of Jubb‟s (1999: 83) definition of whistleblowing into six elements: 
action; outcome; actor; subject; target and recipient, neatly distill (most of) the essential 
problematic dichotomies present in whistleblowing. 
The action, a non-obligatory disclosure means that the disclosure must be freely undertaken 
and not as a result either of coercion or because required by an organisation‟s policies (90). 
We should also distinguish those agents whose professional responsibilities require them to 
disclose irregularities as part of their job function, such as auditors. We will not concern 
ourselves with these so-called „gate-keepers‟, but instead restrict whistleblowing to cover 
only those employees whose job requirements do not as a matter of course require them to 
report malfeasance, whilst acknowledging that such distinction may not always be possible   
to make in practice. The requirement of a non-obligatory disclosure, especially in relation to 
organisational whistleblowing policies is highly contentious, and Jubb‟s position, along with 
his detractors, will be critically analysed later in this chapter, section 5. 
The outcome that gets onto the public record does not require that the disclosure be made 
known to the general public but that “the whistleblower‟s information is accessible without 
too many bureaucratic obstacles” (90). This means that disclosure is made to agencies such as 
an industry Ombudsman, a Public Protector, an Anti-Corruption Commission, Human rights 
NGOs or the “unofficial safety valve of the media”. In the age of social-networking however, 
what constitutes the „public record‟ becomes a very fluid concept. Unofficial whistleblowing 
websites such as Wiki-Leaks become the preferred outlet of disclosure bypassing the afore-
mentioned agencies.  The user-content posted on Facebook, Twitter and You-Tube, with their 
millions of subscribers, arguably capture more faithfully the „public record‟ than do the more 
traditional media outlets.  
The outcome element anticipates the requirement that the disclosure be to a recipient that is 
an external entity.  Again, Jubb acknowledges the polarisation this requirement causes, but 
argues for excluding internal disclosures as acts of whistleblowing (91), because only 
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disclosures to an external entity produce the essential whistleblowing element of dissent, and 
the central whistleblowing dilemma of divided loyalties (82). Dissent and the dilemma of 
conflicting loyalties are explored more fully in the following section which frames the 
discussion as to who or what can be regarded as a legitimate disclosure recipient. 
The actor element, by a person with privileged access to an organisation’s data, includes not 
just former and current employees but also volunteers, unpaid trainees, subcontractors and 
consultants; and in some cases even suppliers and clients, because their relationship with the 
organisation makes them privy to information from which they may learn about 
organisational wrongdoing (86). The actor element, thus conceived, opens up the 
organisation‟s boundaries to its external environment, the implications of which will be 
mapped out when the concept of corporate identity is explored in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.). 
What needs to be explicitly excluded are accounts of organisational wrongdoing uncovered 
through external monitoring or observation, such as investigative journalism and exposés, 
because any information gleaned through such activity is not the result of privileged access.  
The subject element, concerning an illegality or other wrongdoing, covers not just illegality 
or wrongdoing that has actually occurred, but also the suspicion that such illegality or 
wrongdoing might occur, thus giving whistleblowing a preventative function (87). Thus 
conceived, Jubb‟s subject element lowers the burden of proof on the whistleblower, who may 
lack the requisite authority to access the relevant evidence, or is obstructed from obtaining it. 
However, as Bok (1980: 338) warns us, “a concrete risk must be at issue rather than a vague 
foreboding or a sombre prediction.” DeGeorge (1986: 230) argues that whistleblowing is 
justifiable only when organisational wrongdoing will result in “serious and considerable 
harm” to the consumer or general public. Although DeGeorge allows that serious harm may 
include financial and other kinds of harm, he restricts himself to mean only harm that 
threatens life or health. Further examples of wrongdoing can be found in Near et al.(2004) 
who employ seven broad categories of wrongdoing in their empirical study which 
demonstrates that the type of wrongdoing affects the decision whether an individual decides 
to blow the whistle or not. Wrongdoing can amount to (226-7)  
1. Stealing, which includes accepting bribes and using ones position for personal gain.  
2. Waste, which includes ineligible people receiving benefit.  
3. Mismanagement, which includes covering up poor performance and making false 
projections. 
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4.  Safety problems, which includes non-compliant products and dangerous working 
environments. 
5.  Sexual harassment. 
6.  Unfair discrimination based on race, gender, religion etc.. 
7. Other legal violations.  
Closely correlated to the type of wrongdoing, as a predictor of whistleblowing, was the 
quality of evidence that could be produced in support of a claim of wrongdoing – the stronger 
the evidence proving wrongdoing the would-be whistleblower could marshal, the more likely 
the would-be whistleblower would actually make a disclosure (236).  
What exactly constitutes wrongdoing, however, is an open question - what the would-be 
whistleblower perceives as wrongdoing is not always corroborated by the organisation, and 
this crucial act of definition lies at the heart of whistleblowing dissent (see following section.)   
Similarly, what constitutes a non-trivial wrong as against a trivial wrong can be contested by 
both employee and organisation.  
The final element of Jubb‟s definition, the target element, which implicates the organisation, 
holds the organisation accountable for the disclosed wrong (Jubb 1999: 87).  Committing a 
wrong includes “encouragement, perpetration, abetting, connivance; or failing to stop 
wrongdoing when such responsibility is accepted voluntarily or lawfully imposed” (87). In a 
complex entity like an organisation however, determining where or with whom responsibility 
lies, is necessarily problematic. The issue of organisational accountability and the challenge 
of distributed moral agency will be fully addressed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.). 
Jubb also identifies the question of whether motive should be constitutive of a definition of 
whistleblowing as a core dispute in the literature (88) but argues against including it (90) 
because he is aiming at a restrictive definition. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that motive is a 
crucial factor, which requires further examination, both as regards its legal implications  and 
to discern, and then encourage “meritorious, morally courageous whistleblowing” (92). 
Whistleblower motive will be examined in some depth in this chapter, undertaken below in 
Section 4.2. 
Having mapped out the elements in Jubb‟s whistleblowing definition and a programme to 
more thoroughly interrogate those elements we first need, however, to investigate what gives 
rise to the whistleblowing dilemma in the first place. Firstly, whistleblowing must be 
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distinguished from „informing‟ which, widely conceived, constitutes the practice of 
publicising wrongs (77), such as an investigative journalism.  Whistleblowing is then, 
according to Jubb, a special case of informing, because it is dissent (77). Secondly, Jubb 
asserts that his whistleblowing definition is   “… founded on the ethical conflict of role-
related loyalty to an organization and loyalties owed to wider constituencies …” (91). We 
thus first turn to the issues of loyalty and dissent.  
3. Loyalty and dissent 
The ethical problem of whistleblowing arises because of conflicting loyalties - the 
employee‟s loyalty to his/her organisation, which might require the employee to ignore or 
overlook actual or potential wrongdoing committed by the organisation, versus their loyalty 
to society which might require the employee to alert the public of organisational wrongdoing 
which might harm it.  How loyalty is conceived therefore, has direct bearing on how 
whistleblowing should be defined. If only disclosure to external entities, as opposed to 
internal agents, is regarded as an act of organisational disloyalty then only disclosure to 
external entities should count as whistleblowing. What then gives rise to organisational 
loyalty? 
3.1 Conceptualising loyalty 
On commencement of employment with an organisation, the employee‟s duties and 
obligations toward the organisation will be laid out in their employment contract, specified 
inter alia in the job description, code of conduct and the corporation‟s various policies and 
procedures.  However, an employment contract will never be able to exhaustively list every 
obligation and duty owed by the employee to the organisation, simply because it would not 
be possible to envisage every particular scenario that might confront the employee in the 
execution of his/her job requirements.  Organisational loyalty seeks to breach that gap, and 
consists in obedience, confidentiality and avoiding conflicts of interest (Bowie & Duska 
1990: 70-72). Obedience involves following reasonable instructions, while the requirement of 
confidentially takes cognisance of the organisational need to keep its financial, management 
and operational data secret from its competitors. Avoiding conflicts of interest are not 
relevant as it pertains to whistleblowing, although observing wrongdoing which results from 
a conflict of interest may certainly give rise to the need for whistleblowing. Organisational 
loyalty also entails a  “positive attitude” toward the organisation, as opposed to indifference 
or disaffection, because employees have a stake in the organisation, such as receiving wages 
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for example, which depends on the continued existence, if not profitability of the firm 
(DeGeorge 1986: 227). Prima facie then, employees owe loyalty to the organisations they 
work for.  
Firmly against this view Ronald Duska (2004) claims that “one does not have an obligation 
of loyalty to a company, even a prima facie one, because companies are not the kind of things 
that are the proper objects of loyalty” (306).  Corporations exist to make money and 
employees work primarily to earn a salary, thus the notion of organisational loyalty is 
illogical because, Duska argues, loyalty depends on “ties that demand self-sacrifice without 
expectation of reward” (308) such as those found in family relationships or between 
teammates on a sports team.  Duska‟s argument is refuted by John Corvino (2002) who 
shows that even between teammates and in families some reward is often expected when 
sacrifices are made. Corvino however agrees with Duska in claiming that organisational 
loyalty does not conflict with whistleblowing because loyalty demands “… a certain degree 
of tolerance for shortcomings in the object of loyalty” (183). Familiar notions of „We all 
make mistakes‟ and „everyone deserves a second chance‟ seem to be the rationale here. 
Organisations will from time to time fail in certain respects, and they need to be given the 
opportunity to correct their wrongdoing. Public scrutiny, brought about by an external 
disclosure to the media for example, might cause more organisational resources to be diverted 
into dealing with the media fallout, as opposed to correcting the actual problem at hand. 
DeGeorge (1986: 232) concurs with such reasoning, asserting that loyalty requires that the 
firm be given the chance to rectify harmful actions, procedures or policies before “it is 
charged in public.” Such leniency should not, however, be viewed as a license for egregious 
wrongdoing warns Corvino, as loyalty “does not require absolute or complete tolerance” 
(2002: 184). Corvino‟s solution has been criticized for being too vague in its specification of 
exactly how much wrongdoing should be tolerated (Vandekerckhove and Commers, 2004). 
Furthermore, Corvino assumes that the corporation is always (or mostly) benevolent, and that 
its wrongdoing is a result of negligence or ignorance and not mendacity.  
Jukka Varelius (2009) rejects Corvino‟s argument on those grounds, arguing that loyalty need 
not seek the moral good of its object (in this case - the errant organisation.) Considerations of 
what is in the self-interest or moral interest of the organisation and loyalty to the organisation 
are distinct and cannot be merely conflated away. Corvino‟s conception of loyalty fails 
because he fails to acknowledge an important feature of loyalty, i.e. “adherence to the 
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decisions and wishes of its object” (269). What this characteristic acknowledges is the 
autonomy of loyalty‟s object to decide what to do based upon its beliefs of what is in its 
interests. This of course does not mean that an employee cannot or should not try to persuade 
the organisation that its interests should include moral considerations, but that organisational 
loyalty does not require it. (Varelius also rejects Vandekerckhove and Commers‟ (2004) 
position, presented in the next two paragraphs, on these grounds). This notion becomes 
problematic however, when applied to an organisation - what things can be said to embody 
the wishes of an organisation? One possible answer is offered by Vandekerckhove and 
Commers (2004). 
The object of loyalty, according to Vandekerckhove and Commers, lies not in “the physical 
aspects of the company - buildings, executives, boards, hierarchies, colleagues - but the 
explicit set of mission statement, goals, value statement and code of conduct of the 
organization” (2004: 229). An organisation in its mission statement, goals etc. hopes to offer 
to the public, and its employees, not just a description of its purpose, but a legitimation of that 
purpose.  This legitimation can, for example, take the form of incorporating CSR and 
sustainability principles within the mission statement (229), or signing up to the UN Global 
compact
1
. 
Conceiving of the corporation in this manner dissolves the dilemma of divided loyalties 
because if the corporation and its activities are considered legitimate by society, then blowing 
the whistle in order to prevent harm to society can never contradict loyalty to that 
corporation, “any contradiction between those two duties would imply that the object of my 
duty is not a legitimate object” (230).    
Following this, Vandekerckhove and Commers propose that organisational loyalty be 
considered as „rational loyalty‟. The „rational‟ part indicates “the need for the individual to 
make a deliberation whether or not her acts are a contribution to the explicit mission, values 
and goals of the organization she is loyal to” (230).  Any action performed therefore, as an 
action emanating from the „physicality‟ of an organisation - the management structures, 
functional positions etc. - which is in violation of the explicit mission statement, is thus an act 
of potential wrongdoing, or what  Vandekerckhove and Commers  call “goal-displacement” 
                                                          
1
 The Global Compact is an UN initiative that “is both a policy platform and a practical framework for 
companies that are committed to sustainability and responsible business practices” which include the 
“embrace, support and enactment” of ten principles which constitute a set of core values in the areas of 
human rights, labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption. Available at www.unglobalcompact.org. 
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(230). Whistleblowing in this case, as an act of „rational loyalty‟, is not a violation of 
organisational loyalty.  Vandekerckhove and Commers use as an example the Volvo group, 
whose code of conduct commits it to political neutrality. If a plant manager were to use any 
of Volvo‟s assets to assist his local city councilor in his election campaign then „rational 
loyalty‟ would require whistleblowing to realign the goals of the organisational identity and 
organisational setting (230). Vandekerckhove and Commers‟ conception of rational loyalty 
also finds echoes in Rothschild and Miethe (1994: 256) who claim that “whistleblowing has 
become a powerful tool by which ordinary employees … can reveal the gap between the 
organization‟s purported „mission‟ and its actual practices.”  
 3.2 Dissent as indictment and accusation 
Vandekerckhove and Commers‟ way of conceptualizing organisational loyalty assumes that 
internal disclosure qualifies as whistleblowing (2004: 226). The problem with internal 
disclosure is that it misses what some regard as a crucial element of whistleblowing - dissent 
(Bok 1980, Jubb 1999). Dissent, as an instance of disagreement, is what leads one to question 
ones loyalties in the first place. If there is no disagreement then the potential for conflicting 
loyalties disappears.  However, expressing one‟s concerns does not always manifest itself as 
dissent, but if one persists in voicing disagreement, escalating the complaint, then at some 
stage it becomes dissent (Jubb 1999: 79). Concern and disagreement become an indictment, 
labeling certain corporate actions or omissions as misconduct, fraud, or incompetence (79). 
The alleged impropriety is blameworthy and some person or group of persons is accused of 
wrongdoing (Bok 1980: 337). Some person or group of persons must be held accountable. In 
such instances, it is not just a matter of breaching organisational loyalty, but also opposing 
the hierarchy, who may regard the alleged wrongdoing as trivial (337).  
Understood in this light, we can restate that the whistleblower dissent consists in how to 
define corporate wrongdoing and impropriety, and whether such acts or omissions do in fact 
harm the public interest. The employee‟s superior and the organisation will both agree with 
the would-be whistleblower that corporate wrongdoing should be eliminated and that the 
welfare of society should be promoted but disagree as to which specific corporate actions 
would achieve that. Consider a corporation managing its labor relations - prohibiting 
employees from forming a union would be a clear act of corporate wrongdoing and illegality. 
However, in refusing to collect union membership fees from its employees on behalf of the 
union, the corporation, by restricting the union‟s ability to fund its activities, achieves a 
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similar outcome. The organisation may view such actions as „hard-ball‟ tactics to leverage 
greater negotiating power with its employees as legitimate, but an employee may disagree, 
accusing the organisation in the instance of wrongdoing. In so doing, and when he/she does 
so publicly, what the whistleblower does, according to Alford (2001:130), is “bring the 
values of the home and church - the larger world - into the organization.” In the example 
above, the values of fairplay and empathy, considered routine in our dealings with family, 
friends and members of our community, might be rejected by the organisation as not 
applicable in the instance of negotiating with a trade union. Or, to invoke an old business 
ethics controversy, do we have an instance of business bluffing, or business dishonesty? (Carr 
1968). 
3.3 Internal versus external disclosure 
Disclosure to external entities thus “bring[s] the outer world into the inner, transgressing 
boundaries” (Alford 2001: 24). “External disclosure attacks and accuses the organization. 
Internal disclosure shields the organization” (Jubb 1999: 91). Internal disclosure can be 
viewed as collegial disloyalty, as when one „breaks ranks‟ and reports wrongdoing by ones 
colleagues‟ to a superior, but such disclosure represents “dissent from the peer group and not 
dissent from the organization‟s values”(91). Internal disclosure is often seen as merely 
fulfilling one‟s work duties - the celebrated whistleblower Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom, 
honored along with Coleen Rowley of the FBI and Sherron Watkins of Enron, as Time 
Magazine‟s persons of the year in 2002 all only blew the whistle internally.  Her sentiments 
represent a particular notion of whistleblowing; speaking for many when she says: “We don‟t 
feel like heroes. I feel like I did my job” (Layco and Ripley 2002). 
DeGeorge (1986: 231-3) argues that external disclosure is morally justifiable only once 
internal disclosure has been attempted and has subsequently failed to elicit an appropriate 
response. Once an employee has identified a serious threat to the consumer or public, then, 
he/she must first report it to his/her immediate superior and also voice their moral concerns 
(231). If one‟s superiors fail to act on the concerns raised, then the employee should raise the 
issue with a superior further up the managerial chain, ending with the board of directors if 
necessary. In other words, one must first exhaust all possible internal reporting channels 
before going public (232). Such need may of course be precluded by the urgency of the 
threat, especially if a complaint is likely to get bogged down in bureaucracy which would 
waste valuable time in seeking a satisfactory remedy to the wrongdoing (233). Again, the 
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point must be made that internal disclosure gives the benefit of the doubt to the organisation - 
the presumption being that the organisation is benevolent and should be given a chance to 
first correct its errors.  
Others have redefined external disclosure to include internal reporting which bypasses 
“formalized or conventional lines of communication” (Dandekar 1990: 557, cited in Jubb 
1999: 91). An empirical study by Dworkin and Baucus (1998:1296) reveals that external 
whistleblowers are more effective in bringing about change within the organisation, (partly 
because the attention of outside stakeholders is brought to bear) increasing pressure on the 
organisation to respond to the charges (1286). However, external whistleblowers are also 
more likely to be retaliated against (1296).  
4. Retaliation and motivation 
4.1 Retribution strategies: creating the pariah 
The need to protect whistleblowers from organisational retaliation was recognized almost 
from the inception of whistleblowing as a social, political and ethical concern in the 1970s. 
The first significant piece of international legislation towards this end was enacted in 1978 in 
the United States - the Civil Service Reform Act. Although the Act protected the 
whistleblower from reprisals, it was flawed in many respects, such as extending protection to 
only civil servants, and then only for misconduct that had already occurred, thus denying a 
preventative function to curb potential wrongdoing (Vandekerckhove 2006: 170). 
Consequently, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 was passed in the United States to 
address these shortcomings.  Since then, whistleblower protection legislation has been passed 
in several national jurisdictions, including Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. -  the Public 
Interest Disclosures Act (PIDA) of 1998, and South Africa, which passed the Protected 
Disclosures Act (PDA) in 2000,  which variously extended protection to include private as 
well as public sector employees and also to give whistleblowing a preventative function 
(Vandekerckhove 2006: Chapter 4).  Remedies available to whistleblowers are covered in 
Section 4 of the PDA which includes compensation and the right to be moved to a position of 
a similar pay and rank within the same, or another division (The PDA is examined further in 
Chapter 2, Section 3.2). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
2
 2002, enacted in the USA in the 
                                                          
2
  SOX, as far as its provisions regarding whistleblowing are concerned, circumscribes penalties which can be 
levied against the organisation that retaliates against the whistleblower. Other American legislation seeks 
instead to ‘incentivise’ the whistleblower, offering him/her a financial reward for disclosing information 
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wake of the corporate governance scandals of the early 2000s in corporate America, 
exemplified by the spectacular financial implosion of Enron, is unique in that it provides not 
just civil relief to whistleblowers unfairly retaliated against, but also criminal punishment to 
the wrongdoer. The criminal sanctions are harsh - up to ten years in prison and a fine of 
$250 000 (Dasgupta and Kesharwani 2010: 66).   
It is worthwhile to explore some of the retaliation strategies used against the would-be 
whistleblower, because the organisation, in its strategies to “disconnect the act of 
whistleblowing from the act of retaliation,” renders so much whistleblowing protection 
legislation “practically irrelevant” (Alford 2001: 31). Such charges seem to be borne out by 
the fact that in setting up whistleblowing hotlines and reporting channels, most organisations 
include the option to disclose anonymously. While disclosing anonymously is allowed it is 
strongly discouraged, which amounts, in my view, to a tacit admission that the whistleblower 
is still always in danger of being retaliated against, and thus needs his/her identity protected.  
Anonymous whistleblowing can therefore be symptomatic of a deeper amorality within the 
organisation. Alford comments that “anonymous whistleblowing happens when ethical 
discourse becomes impossible” (36). 
 In retaliation, the organisation avoids such overt reprisals as dismissal and demotion, using 
more subtle forms of retribution, which, by demoralising and humiliating the whistleblower 
have the same effect, which is to distance the whistleblower from the organisation. The 
whistleblower is placed under great psychological stress to meet unrealistic performance 
targets for example, while simultaneously denying him/her the resources to meet those 
targets.  The whistleblower is, in short, set up to fail, which then occasions disciplinary 
action. The organisation is then vindicated when the employee is finally fired for poor 
performance or any other reason except his betrayal of company loyalty (2001: 32).  
More disturbingly, the retaliation against the whistleblower does not always end when the 
organisation finally manages to rid itself of the whistleblower; in many niche industries 
informal blacklists exist that ensure the whistleblower never works in his/her field again (Uys 
2000). Alford (2007: 238) recounts the story of a whistleblower that could not get a job in the 
state where she had worked because “They [the potential employers - J.A.] were afraid I 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
regarding corporate wrongdoing. The most notable piece of legislation in this regard is the False Claims Act 
(FCA) of 1986. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 supplemented the FCA in providing financial incentives for 
whistleblowers to come forward. Both the FCA and Dodd-Frank Act are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1.  
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might commit the truth” (238). That is, other organizations are reluctant to hire a 
whistleblower because they, the whistleblower, might just decide to one day blow the whistle 
also on them. Retaliation in this instance then, does not merely involve the whistleblower 
losing his/her former job, but also his/her livelihood. Alford (2001: 55) characterises the 
average whistleblower as, “… a fifty-five year old nuclear engineer working behind the 
counter at Radio Shack. Divorced and in debt to his lawyers, he lives in a two-room rented 
apartment. He has no retirement plan and few prospects for advancement.”    Whistleblowing 
then, can amount to “occupational suicide” (Perry 1998: 235).  
Another common strategy used in retaliating against the whistleblower is what Alford calls 
the “nuts and sluts” strategy, “… referring to the way those who raise ethical issues are 
treated as disturbed or morally suspect” (2001: 61) The former track is initiated by sending 
the whistleblower for a battery of psychological evaluations which, in attempting to portray 
the whistleblower as somehow mentally disturbed, cast serious doubts on his/her accusations 
against the organisation (Bok 1984: 212). The latter track aims at equating the whistleblowers 
alleged, or better still, real promiscuity and associated „loose‟ morals  with a generally 
impaired  moral judgement, which lacks the authority to „call a foul‟ on the organisation.   
What all these retaliation strategies have in common is to isolate the whistleblower, lest 
his/her disease - disloyalty - infect the organisation.  The whistleblower becomes the despised 
other - the „rat‟, „snitch‟, „squealer‟, „tattle-tale‟, „troublemaker‟. The whistleblower, as traitor 
is cast out from the organisation, made a pariah.  It is no surprise then that Alford asserts that, 
however a whistleblower is defined, “… in practice, the whistleblower is defined by the 
retaliation he or she receives … if there is no retaliation, she is just a responsible employee 
doing her job to protect the company‟s interests” (2001: 18). The whistleblower‟s act then 
becomes an act of self-sacrifice. Grant (2002) urges us to go further than merely viewing 
whistleblowers as tragic heroes but as “saints of secular culture.”    
4.2 Fathoming motives 
Why then does the whistleblower persist in his/her course of action? Exploring how 
whistleblowers are sometimes retaliated against provides an insight into the vexatious issue 
of the whistleblower‟s motive in deciding whether to blow the whistle or not. Besides being 
contentious in regard to defining whistleblowing itself, it is also highly relevant in the 
whistleblowing protection legislation.  Qualifying for protection usually requires that the 
whistleblowing is done in good faith (Miceli et al. 2009, Near et al 2004).  Sections 6, 7, 8 & 
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9 of the South African Public Disclosure Act (PDA) of 2000 state that only a disclosure made 
in good faith will be protected. Acting in the public interest to protect it from potential harm 
certainly qualifies as whistleblowing done in good faith.  
DeGeorge (1986: 223) considers only such motivation as moral and requires it in order for 
whistleblowing to be morally justifiable (230).  Whistleblowing in order to exact revenge for 
past injustices, or as acts of malice, taint the whistleblowing act and are not considered as 
appropriate reasons for whistleblowing (Bok 1980: 338). Grant (2002: 394) argues that 
whistleblowing done in anticipation of a reward compromises the ethics of the act. The False 
Claims Act in the United States however, offers the whistleblower a financial incentive in the 
form of a portion of the moneys recovered, in cases of fraud for example, resulting from a 
successful lawsuit stemming from the whistleblowers disclosure (Vandekerckhove 2006: 
173).(See also Chapter 2, Section 3.1.) 
A more subtle but selfish motivation for whistleblowing is to “escape complicity so as to 
protect personal integrity and the ability to live with oneself” (Jubb 1999: 82). Alford (2001: 
76-81) posits a theory of whistleblowing motivation as “narcissism moralized.”  The 
whistleblower acts from a sense of shame, trying to distance himself/herself from the 
organisation‟s wrongdoing that has corrupted him/her by association (73), compromising 
their „ethical purity‟ (78). They blow the whistle because not to do so would be an act of 
supreme hypocrisy, failing to live up to one‟s moral standards, or more pertinently, the 
professed moral standards of the organisation claimed in its mission statement. In the sense 
that the motivation is selfish, it is narcissistic, but because the “whistleblower‟s narcissism is 
wounded by the right thing: that he was cast into an environment of lies and deception” 
his/her narcissism becomes moralized (79) (emphasis added.) Narcissism moralized may also 
explain why the whistleblower is retaliated against and made into a pariah - the whistleblower 
may come across as self-righteous, revealing the timidity and/or hypocrisy of his/her 
colleagues, forcing upon them a questioning of their own values and norms that they would 
prefer to avoid.  
Alford acknowledges that his account does challenge conventional notions of ethics, while it  
simultaneously appears to assert what conventional ethical theories such as Kantianism or 
Utilitarianism (see below) assert, i.e. that the narcissism moralised means “no more and no 
less than that the whistleblower has idealized and internalized” those principles (86). The 
distinction is however, more subtle, - “Whistleblowers [are] loyal not to principles but to 
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ideal selves who embody those principles” (84), and yet also more profound - “narcissism 
moralised means not merely that principle is integrated into the self (when, in fact, it is) but 
that the principle becomes the self … so that holding to this principle is the form in which the 
self‟s perfection is expressed and contained” (86).    
What the conflict concerning whistleblower motives reveals however, is a larger, more 
intractable conflict present within the more general arena of normative philosophy. What is at 
issue is whether Kantian concerns of motive - doing things because they are right in 
themselves, should trump Utilitarian 
 
concerns of consequences - doing things because they 
yield the greatest benefit to society. Kantianism best exemplifies Deontology, whose 
adherents believe that “ethics is about duties and about the intentions with which you do 
them” (Jones et al. 2005: 154). Kantian ethics are encapsulated in the two formulations of 
Kant‟s Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant 1959: 39) - the universalisation 
formulation, and: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of 
another, always as an end and never as a means only” (47) - the human dignity formulation. 
Utilitarianism, as the chief exemplar of Consequentialism, can be distilled into three 
propositions: 1. Actions are to be judged right or wrong solely by virtue of their 
consequences. 2. In assessing consequences, the only criteria is the amount of happiness or 
unhappiness that is created. 3. Each person‟s happiness counts the same (Rachels 2007: 100). 
A whistleblower‟s disclosure may well open up promotion possibilities for him/herself by 
eliminating a rival colleague who is dismissed in the wake of such whistleblowing, and this 
may indeed be his/her primary, or even only, motivation for such disclosure. But should such 
calculating motives stop from bringing to light, and so eliminating, egregious fraud in which 
thousands of taxpayers face financial ruin? From a Utilitarian perspective, such a disclosure 
would still be ethical - in consequence of that act of disclosure, a greater happiness results; 
one person may be denied a promotion and his welfare be consequently diminished, but that 
must be weighed against the welfare of those thousands of taxpayers who now do not suffer a 
financial loss. From a Kantian perspective, however, the disclosure would be unethical. From 
a Kantian dignity formulation the whistleblower is using his/her rival (or more specifically, 
using his/her knowledge of his/her rival‟s wrongdoing) as a means to an end, and even 
though that end may be commendable - preventing financial loss to the taxpayers, the 
disclosure is nonetheless unethical (the end resulting in the elimination of his/her rival would 
also be unethical).  
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More generally, what constrains both Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to whistleblowing is 
that they hope to legislate a set of rules that will apply to all instances of whistleblowing for 
all time, regardless of the specifics and nuances that may present themselves in any particular 
situation. This reach for universality - a hope expressed in the ideals of the Enlightenment - is 
what ultimately undermines Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to ethics in general and 
whistleblowing in particular. (The Enlightenment Ideal is examined in more detail in Chapter 
2, Section 2.) 
The above considerations reveal just how inscrutable motives may be. Whether they are 
included in the definition of whistleblowing or not, the motives of the whistleblower will 
always be relevant, especially from the perspective of the organisation, which will seek 
protection from malicious whistleblowers. The organisation will demand this as a positive 
right against society which as a positive right “requires society to ameliorate whistleblower 
provisions by tightening the criteria whistleblowers must meet or lessening the protection 
offered” (Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu 2010: 370). What the considerations of motive do 
imply, however, is that the would-be whistleblower has a choice in deciding whether to blow 
the whistle or not. If whistleblowing was coerced, or a legislative or organisational 
requirement, then the issue of motive would be irrelevant.  As an interesting counterpoint 
Alford (2001: 40-43, 2007) describes the whistleblower‟s act (one neither coerced or done as 
a result of  legislative or organisational requirements) as an act of “choiceless choice”, 
because of narcissism moralized, captured in such sentiments as “ … I did it because I had to 
… because I had no other choice … what else could I do? I have to look at myself in the 
mirror every morning” (2007: 226). Such narratives may be worth investigating from a 
psychological perspective but we will apply choice here in a more restrictive sense. In the 
following section the discussion turns to whether whistleblowing should be mandatory or not. 
5. Morally mandatory whistleblowing and whistleblowing policies  
The discussion has turned thus far on whether whistleblowing is morally justifiable, and what 
considerations should be taken into account to sanction whistleblowing as morally 
permissible. Those considerations are not unproblematic - should the whistleblower‟s motive 
be moral or not, should the whistleblower disclose internally or not - but they all place the 
decision to blow the whistle or not firmly with the would-be whistleblower. This is in 
accordance with our common sense notions of the individual as an autonomous moral agent, 
responsible for his/her choices. In some circumstances however, might whistleblowing be not 
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just morally permissible but morally obligatory? The potentially dire consequences facing 
any would-be whistleblower as a result of organisational retaliation, and the difficulty of 
choosing between conflicting loyalties, would make us hesitant to place any moral blame on 
any employee who decided to remain silent despite witnessing wrongdoing. Such act is 
supererogatory - morally praiseworthy, but not required, eliciting no censure when not 
undertaken. But there is also a “tacit agreement in our society - some sort of Good Samaritan 
principle - that under certain circumstances there is a moral obligation to prevent 
harm”(Duska & Duska 2003: 152).  
 Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu (2010: 372) cite two viewpoints which assert that one 
should always try to assist in preventing harm:      
 1.Singer (1972: 231) “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do it,” 
 2. Malm (2000: 707) “Persons ought to provide easy rescues and other acts of aid for 
persons in grave peril when they can do so at minimal risk, cost and inconvenience to 
themselves.”  
Although we can agree with these sentiments, the hope to draw a parallel with 
whistleblowing is quixotic. Conflicting loyalties, as has been shown, demonstrate that it is 
always necessary to sacrifice something of comparable moral value to prevent organisational 
wrongdoing from doing harm. Furthermore, as the discussion concerning organisational 
retaliation illustrated, whistleblowing will never be an easy rescue; there is always 
substantive risk and cost to the whistleblower.  
 DeGeorge‟s (1986) attempts to circumscribe conditions for making whistleblowing 
obligatory, rather than helping the whistleblower, seem to add even more cumbersome 
requirements to the already costly and inconvenient path the whistleblower embarks upon. In 
addition to the conditions required for morally permissible whistleblowing -  serious harm 
and internal disclosure (229-233), the whistleblower must, firstly  have “documented 
evidence that would convince a reasonable, impartial observer that one‟s view of the situation 
is correct, and that the company‟s product or practice poses a serious and likely danger to the 
public;” and secondly “the employee must have good reason to believe that by going public 
the necessary changes will be brought about” (234).  
The first condition is problematic for two reasons - as alluded to in Section 2 above, defining 
whistleblowing - requiring documented evidence implies the wrongdoing has already 
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occurred, and this denies a preventative function to whistleblowing. Besides, as DeGeorge 
requires that the disclosure first be made internally, the would-be whistleblower‟s access to 
the relevant evidence, assuming they had the authority to access the evidence, is most likely 
to be blocked. Secondly, having the evidence, the whistleblower may not be able to convince 
a reasonable impartial observer, because the high-tech quality of the harm or the scientific 
nature of the evidence is beyond the comprehension of the observer. A common refrain heard 
during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-9 was that even the most senior, and one supposes 
financially literate, of the banking bosses could not grasp the sophistication and complexity 
of the financial instruments being created and traded within their own organisations. How 
then would a mere reasonable observer make sense of any evidence a potential whistleblower 
from an investment bank might have presented to prevent the ensuing financial collapse?  
The second condition, belief that necessary changes will result, also presents challenges. 
Bringing the „bad apples‟ to account is obviously intended but might it not also mean 
something more, such as getting legislation enacted or policy changed that has a direct 
bearing on the organisational wrongdoing perpetrated? But what if the whistleblower is 
inarticulate? Or ineloquent? We can agree with Bok (1980: 338) that to get problems 
corrected whistleblowing “must arouse its audience”, but should the whistleblower be 
censured because of public apathy? We cannot expect every whistleblower to be a master of 
persuasion. There is also the real and always present danger that the whistleblower is 
genuinely mistaken - mistaken with regard to both the nature of the harm that will result from 
a particular act of the organisation, and also as to what changes will be necessary to 
eliminate, or mitigate that harm. Malicious whistleblowing can be preventatively managed by 
requiring the whistleblower to disclose in good faith, but mistaken whistleblowing, arguably, 
will increase if a duty to disclose is imposed on employees.   
The correlate of the duty to blow the whistle is that if one knows of organisational 
wrongdoing and does not blow the whistle, then one is also guilty of wrongdoing. In order to 
avoid this potential liability we would expect employees to blow the whistle more often, and 
sooner, giving less consideration to the evidence before them, so that they shift this liability 
away from themselves as soon as possible (Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu 2010: 375). As a 
result, one would expect an excessive amount of concerns being raised, leading to more cases 
of erroneous whistleblowing. The pernicious consequences of this danger would also begin to 
manifest themselves in a culture of indictment (377). Closely attendant to this problem is that 
a duty to blow the whistle places the onus of proving one did not know of the wrongdoing on 
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the individual.  Displacing such assumptions might prove unjustly burdensome if for example 
the whistleblower shares an office with the alleged wrongdoer, or works in different 
departments but moves in the same social circles where careless boasting of „cutting corners‟ 
is overheard (375).    
The deeper problem though is determining what course of action will lead to the necessary 
changes DeGeorge speaks about. There is a deep assumption that a direct causal relationship 
between an act of corporate wrongdoing and a particular employee, or group of employees 
can be established, and thus that someone, or some corporate policy or procedure can be held 
responsible. Establishing responsibility in a complex entity such as an organisation is 
however an extremely difficult task (Mellema 2003). It suffices for our purposes at this point 
to agree with Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove (2008: 110) when they say, “people at work are 
held responsible for their moral behaviour, even if they are not or considered not to be 
morally autonomous, since organizations usually prescribe the means (systems/processes) 
and ends (goals/objectives) of behaviour”. 
In its crudest form this means that the employee cannot resort to the Eichmanian excuse of „I 
was just following instructions‟ in order to cast off moral responsibility for an improper act 
committed. Against this must be considered Painter-Morland‟s (2008: 114) assertion that, “it 
is only really possible to hold an organization accountable for the actions of its individual 
employees if one acknowledges that social pressures and expectations in his/her work 
environment significantly influence an individual‟s behaviour.” An example of this is 
provided by King (1999) who argues that whistleblowing may be affected by the structure of 
an organisation. An organisation with numerous hierarchical levels may discourage internal 
disclosure, while clear and open communication channels enhances trust between superiors 
and subordinates, facilitating disclosure of wrongdoing (324). In the final analysis, Lovell 
(2002: 63) sums it up best when he laments that “moral agency becomes the victim of 
autonomy‟s frailty”, which is most vividly illustrated in the case when the organisation 
retaliates against the whistleblower. 
Instituting whistleblowing policies in the workplace, as required either by whistleblowing 
protection legislation or by the demands of „rational loyalty‟ (Vandekerckhove and Commers 
2004: 226), which lay out the mechanisms and protections for disclosure, have the effect of 
strengthening the individual employees autonomy. The employee should now feel free to 
raise moral concerns about organisational wrongdoing without fear of retribution (Tsahuridu 
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and Vandekerckhove, 2008: 114).  Autonomy is now robust, but also, because of that very 
robustness, the organisation is justified in holding employees responsible for not blowing the 
whistle. Autonomy has thus been turned into a liability (115).  Whistleblowing as a duty then 
can “shift the organization‟s duty to abide by the law, the organization‟s requirement to be 
legitimate, and other corporate social responsibilities, to its employees” (116). 
Whistleblowing as a duty then becomes yet another mechanism by which the corporation can 
control its employees (116). 
6. The political dimensions of whistleblowing and the sphere of parrhesia 
6.1 Whistleblowing as „politico-ethical‟ activism 
What is at risk in institutionalising whistleblowing in organisational practices such as 
whistleblowing policies is that whistleblowing will lose the activist impetus which drove its 
earlier conceptualisations. Whistleblowing originated as what Vandekerckhove (2006: 10) 
calls a “politico-ethical” concept which “designated a practice of resistance to organizational 
authority and of unsealing boundaries of accountability for activities of and within 
organizations.”  Whistleblowers warned society of organisational wrongdoing, thus 
protecting the public from corporate rapaciousness (21). Whistleblowing as organisational 
practice is an attempt to eliminate conflict between the organisation and society (21). 
Whether such attempt can possibly succeed, or is in fact desirable, is addressed in the 
chapters to follow. In formulating an answer it is necessary to first examine the overt 
„politico-ethical‟ dimension of whistleblowing, to which we now turn. 
Rothschild and Miethe (1994: 255) argue that whistleblowing, and management‟s response to 
the whistleblowing, are political acts because the former, “from the start … is intended to 
change the way that the work gets done in the organization,” and the latter, “… is intended to 
discredit the whistleblower … [and] neutralize the power of any information they may 
release.”  Uys (2000: 266) urges us to analyse whistleblowing as not “… just being a protest 
on moral grounds” but rather “as a form of political resistance in the workplace” and presents 
a case study of an employee at the South African Reserve Bank who is politicised because of 
higher management‟s reaction and retaliation to his exposing of irregularities within the bank.  
Mansbach (2007: 125) regards whistleblowing as “going beyond an act of disclosure of 
wrongdoing” and as “a practice of high political value.” In the process of resisting 
organisational retaliation and seeking to vindicate themselves in the public arena, the 
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individual‟s act can generate what Mansbach calls the “political surplus value” of 
whistleblowing which benefits a wider segment in society (127). Mansbach presents a case 
study of one Mia Kuch, who sought to bring to the notice of her superiors financial 
irregularities within the organisation, a huge dairy conglomerate, she was working in (125). 
She was later dismissed and when she attempted to challenge that dismissal was subjected to 
psychological evaluations that purported to portray her as mentally disturbed - a not untypical 
organisational retaliation strategy we have examined elsewhere (Section 4.1). At the height of 
her legal battle Mia Kuch then co-founded Oggen - The Association for Ethics and for the 
Eradication of Corruption in Israel; its stated mission to provide “moral support and legal 
advice to whistleblowers and more broadly, to promote the values of democracy … 
inculcating the values of honest administrative practices, accountability and integrity in the 
private and public sectors and educating the public in these values” (128). The establishment 
of Oggen is the „political surplus‟ generated by Kuch‟s whistleblowing, which in benefiting 
other potential whistleblowers and society at large, transforms her individual act into “social 
solidarity” (128). Kuch‟s case should however, not be seen as typical; most whistleblowing 
cases do not generate such dramatic, or socially beneficial, political surplus value.  
Lindblom (2007: 418) argues that whistleblowers‟ (free) speech (disclosure) falls under the 
description of free political speech because “they speak out about one of the basic institutions 
in society” - the corporation, and it is “such speech that potentially could change public 
perception and policy of a problem” (417).  Lindblom uses a Rawlsian argument to show that 
the right to blow the whistle, which is equivalent to the right to free political speech, always 
trumps any purported duty of loyalty to an organisation, because such a duty is in direct 
violation of Rawls first principle of Justice
3
 (419). Furthermore, because the rights that flow 
from that principle of justice are inalienable, contracts that seek to restrict whistleblowing are 
no more legitimate than attempts to sell our political voting rights (420). 
                                                          
3 Rawls is concerned with distributive justice and constructs a theory of justice on the notion of ‘Justice as 
fairness’, which is achieved via two principles (2004.) Rawls’ first principle of justice reads as follows. “Each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for others.” The second principle: “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
such that these are “a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all” (2004: 59). 
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Vandekerckhove (2006: 92-101) considers the legitimation of whistleblowing as upholding 
human rights, in particular the right to free speech as expressed in Article 19
4
 of the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The critical preliminary enquiry of whether private 
business, in addition to government, can be held responsible for human rights in general is 
answered in the affirmative, because inter alia, business also enjoys the means to realise the 
socio-economic conditions which would allow individuals to enjoy their human rights (95). 
Next Vandekerckhove argues that whistleblowing can be understood as a human right, as 
workplace free speech.  To do this he employs arguments put forward by Campbell (2002) - : 
“workplace free speech is an instrumental right promoting truth and efficiency … workplace 
free speech is necessary in order to respect human dignity … workplace free speech 
establish[es] the consensual idea (i.e. an argument for democracy)” (2006: 98). 
Whistleblowing as workplace free speech can however be problematic in practice. Business 
needs to keep its propriety information confidential in order to function, so although it is 
possible to concede that workplace free speech encompasses the right to express one‟s 
opinion, that right would not allow access to information concerning the operations of the 
corporation (99). However, in order to make an opinion meaningful, one usually needs to 
disclose information. Vandekerckhove uses the Ford Pinto
5
 case to illustrate the conflict: a 
design oversight leads to a safety danger in the car, but I am barred from disclosing this 
information (100.) All I can say is that in my opinion the Pinto is a bad car. But in order for 
my opinion to convey any meaning beyond the mere expression of preference I need to 
disclose operational information to motivate why I think the car is bad. Whistleblowing as 
workplace free speech then would need to include the right to disclose information where it 
was necessary to make meaningful sense of the disclosure. 
                                                          
4 Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers. 
 
5
 The Ford Pinto, a subcompact economy vehicle manufactured by Ford in the 1970s, exploded when struck 
from the rear even in low-speed collisions. The cause was traced to the faulty design and positioning of the 
fuel tank. Ford was aware of the serious fire hazard this presented, but pressed ahead with the car’s launch. It 
later emerged that in making its decision, Ford had tallied the costs of a technical improvement that would 
have drastically improved the Pinto’s safety (around $11 per vehicle, on 12.5 million vehicles), done an 
actuarial analysis calculating the probable occurrence of collision fatalities and the financial cost that would 
amount to in legal compensation to the victims. As it would be cheaper to pay out for 180 deaths and 180 
serious burn injuries than install the $11 improvement, Ford went ahead and inflicted the Pinto on the 
American public (Shaw 2011:82-85). 
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Whistleblowing has also been favorably compared with civil disobedience - another political 
form of dissent (Elliston 1982). Within the same public, political arena De Maria (2008) 
seeks an alliance between whistleblowing and protesting as a more robust strategy against 
corruption in both government and business. Both forms of “ethical resistance” (866) seek to 
expose organisational wrongdoing and to bring about change; both activities can manifest 
themselves in internal and external arenas
6
 (867). 
Whistleblowing is presented as an individual voice strategy, while protesting is a voice and 
group mobilisation strategy. It is possible however, to move back and forward between these 
strategies, for example, when a whistleblower decides to join an activist coalition (869). De 
Maria presents a case study to demonstrate the synergies possible through a whistleblowing-
protesting tie-up. Van Buitenen, an auditor in the European Commission‟s Financial Control 
Directorate, unhappy with the efficacy of the division‟s reporting channels which he had 
used, sent a 34-page letter to the president of the Green Party in the European parliament. The 
party used Van Buitenen‟s information to drive its protests, eventually culminating in the 
resignation of the EC president. Van Buitenen‟s journey took him from “silent observer to 
internal whistleblower to external whistleblower to politicized activist” (873).   
6.2 Birth of the parrhesiastes 
In considering the political dimension of whistleblowing it is instructive to take a moment to 
consider the metaphor which informs whistleblowing, something which was only touched 
upon in the chapter‟s introduction. Blowing the whistle evokes the analogy of the referee who 
stops the game in response to a foul. Another analogy is provided by the police officer who 
blows the whistle to summon help to stop a crime or a criminal. The former analogy has been 
found wanting in that unlike the referee, the whistleblower does not have the power to stop 
the game and address the foul. What is pertinent for our purposes however is that blowing the 
whistle always aims to get someone with the power to do something, to listen. To listen is to 
acknowledge that what is spoken is not only coherent but meaningful, i.e. has some truth to 
convey. Recall that one of the retaliation strategies employed against whistleblowers was to 
cast doubt on their mental soundness (see Section 4.1), diagnosing them as unstable. One is 
not obliged to listen to a psychiatric patient whose „truth‟ amounts to no more than paranoid 
                                                          
6
 Internal protests conducted within the organization include work stoppages and sabotage, while external 
protests include street marches and picketing (De Maria 2008:867 table 1). Internal and external 
whistleblowing was discussed in S.3.3 above. 
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or malicious ramblings. To listen, says Alford (2001: 105), “would be to recognize the 
whistleblower as a political actor”.   
Alford refers to Foucauldian „discipline‟7 that “works through diagnosis … under which 
people and things are classified so that they may be subject to expert knowledge” and gives 
as example bureaucratic diagnosis which says “that is not your department and hence not 
your proper concern” (2001: 106.)  We mentioned earlier that at the heart of whistleblowing 
dissent was conflict between the individual and the organisation to define wrongdoing as well 
as what constitutes the public interest (see Section 3). The organisations‟ attempt to claim this 
prerogative as belonging to it exclusively is an attempt at diagnosis vis-à-vis the 
whistleblower. Similarly, what organisational whistleblowing policies do when they classify 
certain disclosures as protected or certain channels as legitimate, is in effect disciplining the 
whistleblower, and in so doing, “transforming an existential and ethical act into another piece 
of behaviour that may be analysed and explained”(2001: 106); behaviour which, as we saw in 
Section 5, that can be controlled.   
How then do we approach what Jones et al.(2005: 120) call, “the fundamental issue [of] how 
to provide a legitimate - if dangerous - social identity for the person who speaks fearlessly?” 
The whistleblower „speaks truth to power‟, what the ancient Greeks called a parrhesiastes - a 
truth teller.  In contrast the rhetor is one who merely tries to persuade. Rhetoric is a technique 
that can be learnt, while engaging in parrhesia is a way of life (2005: 121). Rhetoric, known 
as the art of „spin‟ and Public Relations in 20th and 21st century boardrooms, is what leads to 
ethical ambiguity in business, turning praiseworthy notions such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility into cynical marketing ploys. Corporate rhetoric causes „moral silence‟, 
causing individuals to remain quiet about concerns in relation to their work (Bird 1996). This 
muting of ones‟ conscience engenders moral deafness: not hearing and not responding when 
others raise moral concerns (55). As Jones et al. (2005: 121) say: “Whistleblowing is only 
possible if there are people to hear the whistle being blown”.  The whistleblower as 
parrhesiastes then, becomes the collective social conscience in the organisation representing 
the boundary, or limit, of acceptable transgression that will be tolerated by the public in 
                                                          
7
 In Discipline and Punish (1979) Foucault analyses disciplinary power in the prison as a metaphor for how it 
operates in modern society.  Disciplinary power comes about through physical control which is “  an 
uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of activity rather than its results and it is exercised 
according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement. These methods, which 
made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of 
its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called disciplines” (137). 
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general, and a specific stakeholder community in particular.  The dynamics and implications 
of conferring this social identity upon the whistleblower will be fully explored in Chapter 3. 
7.  Conclusion 
In the final analysis the politics of whistleblowing end up being inextricably linked to the 
ethics of whistleblowing. The difficulties in defining and justifying whistleblowing shuttle us 
back and forward between these two domains, between contemplation and action, between 
theory and practice. The political issue of the whistleblower‟s social identity is rooted in 
whistleblowing‟s central ethical dilemma: who has the power to define what loyalty is and to 
whom, or what is it owed? Deciding where the ethics of whistleblowing end and the politics 
of whistleblowing start becomes impossible when we start asking those questions that go to 
the heart of whistleblowing: who defines what the public interest is? Who decides whether 
internal or external disclosure amounts to a legitimate act of whistleblowing? Who decides 
whether the motive of the whistleblower should be scrutinised, or even whether it should be 
relevant? 
The seeming intractability of these questions points at a more fundamental problem, rooted 
deeply in the particular ethical theories we turn to in order to make sense of whistleblowing‟s 
essential aporia.  What these theories all critically depend on is a particular conception of the 
moral agent as instanced by a particular employee - the employee who can blow the whistle 
because it is the right thing to do, giving no further consideration as to how that decision 
might impact upon her life and her family, resulting in the loss of her job and livelihood; the 
employee who can transcend the precariousness of her daily circumstances and reach an 
objective and rational decision; the employee who can bracket  her identity as an individual 
while she calculates the optimum course of action. What this demand for an objective 
rationality requires is a universalism that attempts to transcend time and place. It is this 
attempt to find fixed principles, what can also be called a rules-based approach, which 
ultimately fails to produce a satisfactory ethics of whistleblowing.  
As we observed in Section 3, fixed principles and the slavish adherence to rules that brook 
no, or limited, exception fail to provide an acceptable solution to the dilemma of divided 
loyalties - in some instances organisational loyalty should be given priority, while in other 
instances the interests of the public should be the overriding consideration. Fixed principles, 
no matter how numerous, will not allow us to consider all possible scenarios.  By extension, a 
rules-based approach proved inadequate to address the important dichotomy of whether 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
internal or external disclosure should count as whistleblowing. Similarly, a rules-based 
approach failed, as we observed in Section 4, to prescribe only moral motives in disclosure, 
which withered in the face of fierce organisational retaliation against whistleblowing. Section 
5 demonstrated how attempts to embed ethical principles by institutionalising them within 
whistleblowing legislation and policies could inadvertently make employees morally and 
legally culpable by shifting responsibility, and thus making whistleblowing mandatory.  
In section 6, we examined how a rules-based approach kicked up vexing political problems 
for the whistleblower. At that stage a new conceptualisation of whistleblowing, as the 
practice of parrhesia - truth telling was briefly mooted as a way forward in thinking about 
whistleblowing. In order to give substance to this new social identity for the whistleblower as 
parrhesiastes we need to discard the rules-based approach - the Enlightenment ways of 
thinking about ethics and politics - and situate ourselves within a new ethical framework. In 
the next two chapters we describe and develop that framework.  
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Chapter 2:  Legitimising whistleblowing within a global context 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 exposed the limitations of a rules-based approach to whistleblowing. We 
characterised these as Enlightenment approaches which attempt to fix ethical guidelines in 
order to circumscribe an ethics of whistleblowing. We start this chapter by briefly examining 
the aims and ideals of the Enlightenment, as well as its flaws and weaknesses which 
ultimately proved its undoing. As a way forward from that failure we seek to understand 
whistleblowing as a cultural and historical social practice; thus our focus in this chapter shifts 
away from the “foundationalist emphasis on the consciences” of individual whistleblowers to 
“how individual [whistleblowers] are positioned within discourses” (Perry 1998: 240). This 
chapter then, examines the whistleblower within various cultural and historical contexts, the 
most pertinent being the context of globalisation within the last thirty years. Examining 
whistleblowing and whistleblowers in this manner reveals that certain whistleblowing issues 
such as motive and loyalty, and internal or external disclosure, are understood differently in 
different cultural and historical contexts. As such, how those issues are approached and 
resolved also differs markedly. There have however been salient global trends in attempting 
to resolve the dilemmas posed by whistleblowing, which manifest themselves in 
whistleblowing protection legislation and organisational whistleblowing policies. These 
global trends in legitimising whistleblowing policies do not, however, in the final analysis, 
offer a satisfactory resolution to the dilemmas and dichotomies of whistleblowing, such as 
whether internal or external disclosure should qualify as whistleblowing, or whether loyalty 
to the organisation should trump concerns of harm to the public interest.  
In Section 3 we examine whistleblowing within the American and South African cultural 
context. That examination will demonstrate that attempts to posit certain whistleblowing 
dichotomies, such as whistleblower motive, as universal concerns are bound to fail, and that a 
satisfactory ethics of whistleblowing will always be sensitive to the contingencies 
surrounding it. Section 4 expands the examination of whistleblowing as a cultural and 
historical social practice, seeking to understand whistleblowing within the context of the 
globalisation of the last thirty years. In order to facilitate that examination we employ 
Vandekerckhove‟s „network perspective‟, which he equates with autopoietic systems. He 
builds on Luhmann‟s (1980, 1995) work to construct a globalisation „semantic‟ which he then 
uses to construct normative legitimisations for whistleblowing policies. We focus in 
particular on his OSR (organisational social responsibility) legitimisation, which attempts to 
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eliminate the conflict between society and organisation, a conflict which in turn gives rise to 
the necessity of whistleblowing in the first place. Ultimately, Vandekerckhove‟s project 
falters and in Section 5 this is attributed to his understanding of networks as autopoietic 
systems. Finally, the outlines of a possible way forward from Vandekerckhove‟s paradox - 
that encouraging whistleblowing needs an open and democratic society, but that 
whistleblowing itself contributes to an open and democratic society - are sketched.     
2. Modernism and the Enlightenment ideal 
In Chapter 1, our exegesis of whistleblowing ethics revealed several problematic 
dichotomies, as well as a central dilemma that was not satisfactorily resolved, which we again 
identified above.  Perry (1998: 236) offers his assessment of the current understanding of 
whistleblowing:  
All [the] studies contribute to the unproblematic reproduction of the legacy of the 
modern through the replication and naturalization of its narrative conventions. What is 
foregrounded in these analyses is: the ethico-political stance of the whistleblower 
versus the governing realpolitik of the system, moral wo/man against immoral 
organization: the spirited resistance of the precariously sovereign individual against 
repressive social control. Interpreted in this way, „blowing the whistle‟ thus becomes 
a colloquial and contemporary characterization of the enduring verity of 
Enlightenment ideals. 
In other words the Enlightenment ideal of universal and immutable ethical principles fails to 
adequately address the essential aporia at the heart of whistleblowing. Reason and objectivity 
- the legacy of Modernism - cannot always determine whether the welfare of society or 
organisational loyalty should be the summum bonum to which the whistleblower must 
concede in deciding whether to blow the whistle or not. The whistleblower fails the 
Enlightenment ideal when s/he cannot put aside his/her personal motives and interests and 
transcend the contingency of his/her situation to make a rational decision about whether to 
blow the whistle or not. S/he might fail in this regard for several reasons, most notably 
because s/he must consider the possibility that in blowing the whistle  s/he may well lose 
his/her job and thus not be able to support his/her family. Before we consider Perry‟s 
alternative to whistleblowing as a manifestation of the Enlightenment, we briefly discuss 
some of the features and failings of Modernism and the Enlightenment.  
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Modernism was an era commencing in the 18
th
 century and dedicated to infusing knowledge, 
Man and his institutions with the Enlightenment ideal. The Enlightenment starts with the 
collapse of the Divine and preordained order, “the withdrawal of God mean[ing] a triumphant 
entry of man” (Bauman 1992: xii). In other words, in the absence of the certainty of the 
Divine, certainty must be found in Man and his faculties, primarily the faculty of reason; or if 
not there, then his senses and experiences. Order, no longer guaranteed by God, would need 
to be imposed by the institutions of Man. The application of Reason would yield principles 
that would bracket and make irrelevant the contingencies of Man, like his corporeality and 
the station of his birth; all these would become subject to an immutable Universalism. 
Contingency would yield to design; randomness would give way to predictability. The 
theistic teleology that informed History would now be taken up by the idea of Progress, an 
inevitable path toward Truth and Utopia. Knowledge would only advance, strengthening the 
foundations of Reason, on which the modern era built its shelter against uncertainty (Bauman 
1992). 
In the realm of ethics, Reason would also discover those universal and immutable principles 
which would govern the conduct of man in his dealings with others. Such interactions would 
not be left to circumstance, or to the caprice of the individual. Ethical decision-making would 
be calculable and hence rational. Morality would “make sense … Moral acts are means to an 
end” (Bauman 1993: 56) (Italics in original). Whether that end was advancing  the greatest 
happiness of Man as envisaged by Mill, or respecting Man‟s inherent dignity as proclaimed 
by Kant, or the attainment of justice through a social contract as envisaged by Rawls, all 
attempts proceeded “from the implicit general assumption that the world is governed by an 
orderly system of rules and principles” (Painter-Morland 2008: 51). Reason would discover 
those rules which any man, in any situation, at any time, could appeal to in assisting him to 
decide what to do; whether his purported action was „right‟ or „wrong‟. He would not need to 
„search his soul‟ or his conscience  to decide if his deeds were „good‟ or „bad‟; he would 
merely need to calculate how his choice compared with the particular applicable rule and so 
discover that indeed his choice was right or wrong.  As Bauman (1993: 60) would say: 
“Rules would tell me what to do and when; rules would tell me where my duty starts and 
where it ends.” 
However, one could always postulate an exception to a rule, thereby frustrating any attempt 
to universalise any precepts of conduct; and a moral dilemma could throw two ethical 
principles into conflict, thus rattling the foundations so assiduously constructed. In failing to 
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discover rational, universal principles to justify morality, the Enlightenment project 
inevitably became vulnerable to the power of the Nietzschean critique: if Reason cannot 
ground morality, then morality is nothing but the expression of the will of the dominant. 
Although Nietzsche‟s notion of the will to power and the Superman might be seen as 
questionable to some, Nietzsche‟s value was in showing how “the claim of objectivity masks 
subjective motivations” (Burrell 1988: 224). 
Consequentialism, best exemplified by Utilitarianism faltered because the notion of the 
commensurability of values into an overarching principle of happiness was inherently flawed. 
The attempt failed because the abstraction of values needed for a Utilitarian calculus rendered 
it “incapable of adequately considering the meaning and significance of particular actions as 
experienced by those who are affected by them” (Painter-Morland 2008: 54). Deontology, 
best exemplified by Kantianism, faltered because it assumed it was always possible for a 
moral agent to “retreat from his/her immersion in particular role responsibilities and employ 
the universalization test in order to judge the categorical validity of various possible courses 
of action” (59). Similarly, Social Contract theories such as Rawls‟ notion of Justice as 
fairness assume an autonomous moral agent who can transcend the contingencies of their 
existence and knowledge to make an objective evaluation of an ethical situation. All these 
Enlightenment theories also faltered in their attempts to provide adequate justifications for 
whistleblowing; and thus to provide satisfactory resolutions to the problems inherent in 
whistleblowing, such as whether loyalty was owed first to the organisation or the society in 
which one lived, or under which conditions external disclosure was permissible. 
All these failed attempts to discover universal and immutable principles thus opened the door 
not only to question whether such principles did in fact exist or not, but also, more 
importantly, whether such a project was at all worthwhile. One such stream of questioning,  
dubbed the „Continental tradition‟, “seek[s] to understand the way in which human 
subjectivity is shaped and informed in and by the confluence of historical, societal and 
cultural variables in the lives of individuals” ( Painter-Morland 2008: 91). It is to this 
tradition which Perry turns to understand the ethics of whistleblowing. 
3. Whistleblowing as ‘historically determined and culturally mediated social practice’ 
Perry‟s (1998: 239) solution to the difficulties that result from understanding whistleblowing 
“as the manifestation of prior ontological certainties or universal truths” is to instead view 
whistleblowing “as an historically determined, institutionally shaped, culturally mediated 
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social practice”, which is “constituted in and through the social order that generates them, the 
discourses that articulate them and the subject positions which realize them.” Such an 
approach will thus be more sensitive to context and see “whistleblowing practices as tracers 
of shifts and realignments within and between discursive and institutional structures” (240).  
Perry contends that there are different types of whistleblowing associated with different types 
of discourses represented by science and technology, the law and ethics (241). Perry, in his 
paper, restricts himself to analysing only whistleblowing deriving “its impetus from scientific 
and technological notions of rationality” but states that this theoretical approach has a wider 
applicability than just scientific whistleblowing (243).  Before we turn to an analysis of 
whistleblowing within the legal and ethical domains, we first conduct an examination of 
whistleblowing within the social context of two countries, the USA and South Africa, which 
neatly demonstrates Perry‟s argument that whistleblowing should be viewed as a historically 
determined, institutionally shaped, culturally mediated practice which is symptomatic of 
political processes. 
3.1. The American Context 
In the USA the False Claims Act (FCA) of 1986 allows a whistleblower who sues in the 
name of the US government in relation to fraud to also sue for themselves (Vandekerckhove 
2006: 173). What this means is that the individual or organisation who files the law suit under 
the FCA gets a percentage of the money the government is able to recover. The FCA, (also 
known as the Qui Tam Law) dates to 1863 when it was enacted during the American Civil 
War to “protect the Union Arms against fraudulent suppliers who sold sawdust for gun 
powder” (173). The mechanics of the act require the whistleblower to bring the law suit and 
go to trial first, and only then does the government decide whether it wishes to join the law 
suit or not. If the government joins, the whistleblower can expect to receive 15-25% of the 
amount recovered, if the government does not join, that amount increases to 25-30% (173).  
While whistleblowing legislation around the world has tended to influence and be influenced 
by whistleblowing legislation in other countries (292-4), the FCA has not been copied by any 
other country (at least not yet) (295). Vandekerckhove argues that this anomaly can be 
explained by two characteristically American cultural aspects. The first is that there exists a 
litigation culture within the USA, meaning that “taking disputes to court is a commonly 
accepted practice” (295). Second is the „employment-at-will‟ doctrine central to labour 
practices within the USA (295). Employment-at-will means that “an employer may discharge 
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his employee for any reason, or for no reason, … either side is free to terminate it at any time 
without advance notice or reason” (Shaw 2011: 305). Compare that freedom to hire and fire 
with the provisions of the South African Labour Relations Act (LRA)
8
 66 of 1995 which 
under Chapter 8, S.185 require a dismissal to be for a fair reason and in accordance with a 
fair procedure, on the grounds of an employee‟s conduct, capacity or the operational 
requirements of the business. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), in its whistleblowing 
protection provisions (see Chapter 1, Section 4.2.), does temper the employment-at-will 
doctrine, the overwhelming historical context, dating back from the 19
th
 century (Shaw 2011: 
305), ensures that the spirit of the doctrine still pervades the employment relationship. SOX 
thus represents an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, not an overhaul of it; and in 
a self-reflexive manner, litigation, as the other cultural aspect affecting whistleblowing in the 
USA, thus becomes the whistleblower‟s way to balance the asymmetry of power inherent in 
the employment-at-will doctrine.  
These two American cultural aspects have a distinct influence on the way whistleblowing is 
perceived in the USA, by the organisation and the would-be whistleblower, and thus impacts 
how the whistleblowing dilemma of loyalty (see Chapter 1, Section 3.1) and the dichotomy of 
motivation (see Chapter 1, Section 4.2), are approached.  Employment-at-will means that in 
practice, organisational loyalty will weigh more heavily in the deliberations of the would-be 
whistleblower, if only because ones occupational livelihood is more precarious and more 
subject to the caprice of the organisation one works for. Similarly, the corollary of 
employment-at-will, from the organisation‟s standpoint, is that organisational loyalty 
becomes a more pressing consideration, perhaps, in some cases even requiring, as in that 
other American mythologised institution - the Mafia - an injunction of total obedient silence: 
the code of Omerta.   
The FCA and the litigation culture mean that in practice, in the USA, whistleblower 
motivation is little considered, if at all. Rather what drives whistleblowing is that it is a 
valuable source of information leading to the capitalistic virtue of efficiency, which has the 
moral connotation of not wasting (Vandekerckhove 2006: 135) (see also below - Section 4.2). 
The FCA was supplemented by some of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act,
9
 enacted in 
2010, one of the new laws passed by Congress in the USA in the wake of the global financial 
                                                          
8
 LRA available at http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/acts/labour-relations/read-online/document.2008-05-
29.2826668274. (Accessed 1 June 2011). 
9
 available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04173:@@@L&summ2=m&#major%20actions 
(accessed 2 June 2011). 
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crisis of 2007-9.  Amongst other things this required the SEC (America‟s Securities & 
Exchange Commission) to announce new rules to encourage whistleblowing on May 25
th
 
2011. The inducements include 10-30% of fines of over $1 million that result from tip-offs. 
The onerous expenses and time involved in bringing a law suit to trial, as required under the 
FCA, are now a thing of the past.  All the mercenary-motivated whistleblowers, or as the US 
Chamber of Commerce, in response to the SEC‟s announcement calls him/her, “amateur 
sleuths in search of a big payday”, has to do is pick up the phone and report suspicion of 
wrongdoing; collecting hard and actionable evidence is no longer necessary, as was required 
under the FCA.  The US chamber of commerce went on to call the new scheme a “bounty 
programme.” 10 Once again, what this reveals is how such approaches to whistleblowing are 
embedded in the cultural milieu of the USA - the sovereignty of the individual pursuing the 
all-American dream of fame and fortune by pushing the frontiers of a ruthless and 
unsentimental Capitalism.  Paradoxically, this leads to the erosion of organisational loyalty, 
where loyalty becomes just another commodity to be auctioned off to the highest bidder. 
3.2. The South African (and African) context 
Whistleblowing in South Africa must be understood within the context of the country‟s 
Apartheid past. The heavy weight of that damaged and damaging past has “meant that 
speaking openly and confidently about wrongdoing is not part of the national psyche” 
(Martin 2010: 1). Waging the Struggle required activists, operating underground, to handle 
sensitive and incriminating information with extreme caution. Confidentiality and keeping 
operational secrets from the Apartheid regime was a matter of life and death. Besides the 
oppression sanctioned against the black majority through legislation, regulation and policy, 
the Apartheid government also waged a clandestine war against the ANC and numerous other 
banned political organisations. Aiding the Apartheid regime in this war was the recruitment 
of „impimpis‟ – informants who, for monetary and other rewards, spied and reported on 
others to the Apartheid authorities, often with devastating consequences -torture and death. 
This “connotation of impimpi attached to reporting wrongdoing still lingers on” 
(Vandekerckhove 2006: 221). This history, “not dissimilar to former Soviet Bloc countries … 
has unfortunately allowed the stigmatisation of whistleblowing as an activity to be despised 
rather than to be encouraged” (Camerer 2001: 1).  
                                                          
10
 Quote taken from unnamed author in The Economist, May 28
th
 2011, p. 65, insert entitled ‘Corporate Crime: 
Give a little whistle.’ 
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The result is that when South Africa‟s whistleblowing protection law, the Protected 
Disclosures Act (PDA) was promulgated in 2000 and came into operation in 2001 it was only 
half-heartedly embraced (Martin 2010: 1). Even the trade unions, an influential agent of 
resistance against Apartheid and still a formidable political force within South Africa, 
although “in principle supportive of the PDA [are], in practice, cautious to apply its 
protections” (5). More alarmingly, there seems to be a lack of political will in implementing 
the PDA. Uys in a 2008 paper (7 years after the enactment of the legislation) laments that 
“the regulations that should have been published by the Department of Justice are still not 
forthcoming and the South African Law Commission‟s investigation into the act seems not to 
have proceeded beyond asking for public comment on an Issue Paper in 2003” (2008: 918). 
The Commission did eventually publish a final report in 2009, offering some 
recommendations, but engagement is now needed with the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development on the way forward for those recommendations (Martin 2010: 6-
7).  
This ambivalence can be traced back to the origin of the PDA in the Open Democracy Bill 
(first drafted in 1995). The Open Democracy Bill was eventually split into the PDA and the 
Promotion of Access to Information Bill, which was also enacted in 2000. Whistleblowing 
legislation in South Africa was thus “promoted and enacted as part of a democratisation 
process” (Vandekerckhove 2006: 287). South Africa is one of the very few countries where 
whistleblowing legislation seeks to legitimise itself by reference to human rights (See 
Chapter 1, Section 6.1). The preamble to the PDA “explicitly places the provisions in a 
context of democratization, referring to human rights values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom” (287). Furthermore and uniquely, the subject element (what type of wrongdoing 
can be disclosed) includes „unfair discrimination‟ (S.1. (i.)(f)), which is befitting of 
ameliorating the legacy of Apartheid‟s discriminatory past.  
The problem for South Africa however, is, as posed by De Maria (2005), whose argument is 
summed up by Vandekerckhove (2006: 314), that “whistleblowing policies do not create but 
rather need democracy.”  De Maria (2005: 217) raises several misgivings about whether 
whistleblowers can be adequately protected in developing countries and identifies several 
prerequisites for effective whistleblowing, amongst them: “ubiquity of the rule of law, the 
legitimacy of state anti-corruption agencies and public confidence in disclosure as an anti-
corruption device”. The importation of Western whistleblowing laws into Sub-Saharan 
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Africa, including South Africa, (the PDA was largely based on the British PIDA
11
 - De 
Maria, 2005: 221) are bound to fail, according to De Maria, because “African corruption is 
fundamentally different from Western corruption” (225).  
Corruption in the West is understood as “the malpractice of individual rogue citizens” and 
whistleblowing aims “to eradicate essentially discrete acts of non-systemic wrongdoing 
through individual reporting” (222). Remarkably, points out De Maria, there are no 
whistleblowing laws anywhere in the world that offers protection to a class, or group of 
people disclosing. This confirms the value-context of the West: a worldview in which the 
notion of the individual is supreme (222). De Maria claims that “no commentator on African 
corruption is prepared to consider it in these individualist terms” (222).  If corruption is 
systemic, i.e. understood and accepted as the way society and government functions then 
whistleblowing policies will fail simply because few people will be morally outraged and risk 
being socially ostracized.  
Michela Wrong (2007), in It’s our turn to eat: the story of a Kenyan whistleblower attributes 
the political violence that followed Kenya‟s 2007 disputed election, not to citizen outrage at 
government corruption in general, but to one ethnic tribe -  the Luos, who were once again on 
the verge of being side-lined. Their candidate, Raila Odinga, was being outmanoeuvred into 
taking up the country‟s presidency, and thus the Luos were potentially being denied their 
opportunity to indulge in systemic corruption for their benefit. Wrong continues: “a Raila 
presidency would surely mean new jobs, fresh investment, new roads, hospitals and schools 
for the Luos, just as it had for the Kikuyu under Kenyatta and the Kalenjin under Moi” (300). 
The manipulated election results presented by the incumbent government, “had conspired to 
rob their community of its rightful turn at the trough” (302). Corruption in Africa is thus not 
the doings of a few rotten apples, but normal social practice -institutionalised; “generalised 
and banalised” (De Sardan 1999: 28).   
De Maria also calls Western whistleblowing “a child of the city … designed to complement 
the anonymous spaces of work and urban living” (2005: 223). Whistleblowing is primarily 
about reporting on strangers engaged in wrongdoing at the workplace, which does not lend 
itself well as a mechanism when “graft[ed] onto the complex lacework of work-family 
connections one finds in Africa and equally difficult to apply to close-knit rural 
                                                          
11
 The Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998 provides for the protection of whistleblowers within the United 
Kingdom. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23/introduction/enacted.  
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communities” (224). He cites an illuminating insight by De Sardan (1999: 30): “… In a „face 
to face‟ society the price of open conflicts is too high. It is unthinkable to denounce to the 
police a relative, a neighbour, the relative of a friend, that is someone with whom one has a 
personal tie, even a weak one: social disapproval would be too heavy.”  
The hope therefore that only increased whistleblower protections in Africa and South Africa 
will result in increased levels of disclosures of wrongdoing is thus misguided because it 
ignores this social context. However, increased whistleblowing protection is still needed in 
Africa and South Africa.  To this end Lewis & Uys (2007: 88-9) offer some suggestions 
which include treating retaliation against a whistleblower as a criminal offence (as SOX does 
– see Chapter 1, Section 4.1), and allowing unlimited compensation that can be awarded to a 
whistleblower, up from the current cap of two year‟s salary allowed by the PDA. A most 
perspicacious recommendation, in the light of the immense political power the trade unions 
command in South Africa and the trust naturally present within the relationship between 
worker and union, is that union representatives be given a „prescribed persons‟ status in terms 
of the PDA. A prescribed person is a person a whistleblower can disclose to and still enjoy 
the protections granted by the PDA, as for example a legal adviser (S.5) or a member of 
cabinet (S.7)   On the other hand, this privilege may be abused; an unscrupulous trade union 
might decide to leverage information gained from a disclosure made to it by one of its 
members against the organisation during the wage-bargaining process to extract more 
favourable concessions.
12
  
More worryingly for the would-be whistleblower within the South African context is the 
current (2011) political climate of fear and suspicion, and the threat posed to the robustness 
and freedom of the press to report on corruption and impropriety, particularly within the 
government sector. The proposed Protection of Information Bill
13
 grants exceptional 
discretionary powers to all „heads of organs of state‟ (of which there exist roughly about 
1000) to classify  information as secret and so subject that information to the provisions of 
the Bill which include mandatory prison sentences for any person who discloses such 
classified information. The fear is that this power might be abused to cover up impropriety 
and corruption, the provisions in the Bill against arbitrary classification notwithstanding. 
Furthermore, the bill does not protect would-be whistleblowers from prosecution if they 
                                                          
12
 I owe this insight to Woermann from a discussion of whistleblowing held at the University of Stellenbosch in 
2011. 
13
 The Protection of Information Bill is available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/POIBILL.PDF (accessed 11 
June 2011).  
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disclose classified information even if such information is deemed in the public interest.
14
 
These provisions run contrary to the spirit of the PDA. It seems therefore, that the conditions 
necessary for effective whistleblowing in South Africa, as identified by De Maria above, still 
need to nurtured and strengthened. 
The examination of whistleblowing within the contexts of the USA and South Africa 
demonstrate that theoretical attempts to posit certain whistleblowing dichotomies, such as 
whistleblower motive, as universal concerns, are bound to fail - while some theorists and 
jurisdictions may agonise over its importance, the Americans are content to bracket the issue 
of whistleblower motive and move on. Even the central whistleblowing dilemma of divided 
loyalties cannot be cast as an aporia in monolithic and universal terms.  The repressive social 
order of Apartheid shaped a distinctive notion of trust, and hence to whom, or what, loyalty is 
ultimately owed. Whistleblowing, understood as a „historically determined, institutionally 
shaped, culturally mediated social practice‟, also influences how we proceed in encouraging 
meritorious whistleblowing. A demand to increase whistleblower protections against 
organisational retaliation in a uniform and standard manner will not necessarily lead to the 
same result; in the individualist West it might lead to more disclosures, but not in a more 
community-orientated society such as Africa.    
4. The normative legitimisation of whistleblowing within the global context 
The previous section aimed to demonstrate an understanding of whistleblowing within 
particular historical and cultural contexts. Such an approach can broadly be said to 
encompass „place‟.  In attempting to understand the evolution (in time) of whistleblowing we 
turn in this section to Perry‟s injunction to view whistleblowing “as tracers of shifts and 
realignments within and between discursive and institutional structures” (1998: 240) 
(emphasis added).  Notions of the ethics of whistleblowing as fixed and immutable in time, as 
the Enlightenment ideal would have it, are ill conceived.   
                                                          
14
 After mounting pressure from civil society, the media and former prominent members of the ANC, the South 
African government announced on 25 June 2011 several amendments to the bill, the most important being 
limiting the power to classify to state security bodies and scrapping mandatory prison sentences for disclosing. 
However, an exemption for whistleblowers who disclose classified information in the public interest has still 
not been addressed. The government also extended the deadline for the bill to 23 September 2011. (‘Press 
backs info bill amendments’- Business Report, 27 June 2011, available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/press-backs-info-bill-amendments-1.1089121 accessed 27 June 
2011. 
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Our understanding of the ethics of whistleblowing must be sensitive to different historical 
and cultural contexts and different periods within those particular contexts. Thus, for 
example, it was pointed out above in Section 3.2 that within the South African context the 
trade unions had been reluctant to enlist the protections of the PDA. However, “unions are 
now turning their attention to tender irregularities among public officials with calls to 
„blacklist state looters‟ and more recently lifestyle audits … unions are leading the way with 
calls for more disclosures to hold organizations/politicians to account” ( Martin 2010: 5). 
This change, essentially in the understanding of organisational loyalty, can be attributed to 
the fact that with the Apartheid government overthrown, the interests of the trade unions and 
its erstwhile political allies, now the ruling power, have increasingly begun to diverge. As the 
struggle for liberation has moved to the economic realm, the trade unions have started to 
recognise that their proper role is in civil society, holding the government to account. As a 
result their attitudes to whistleblowing have changed.  
This section aims to explore how the ethics of whistleblowing has evolved over the past thirty 
years within a global context.  Vandekerckhove (2006: 304) argues that whereas in the early 
1970s whistleblowing was a politico-ethical concept pointing at a conflict between 
organisation and society, by the end of the 1990s that politico-ethical concept was being used 
to legitimise whistleblowing policies, and hence seemed to be presented as a politico-ethical 
concept able to eliminate conflict between organisation and society. (See also Chapter 1, 
Section 6.1.)  Vandekerckhove aims to trace the historical shifts in how the categories of 
individual, organisation and society within the whistleblowing context relate to one another 
(30). The profile of whistleblowing in the media has certainly increased since the 1970s - 
witness the naming of the whistleblowers Cynthia Cooper, Coleen Rowley and Sherron 
Watkins as Time magazine‟s persons of the year in 2002, as well as the Hollywood 
hagiographies Silkwood (1983), The Insider (1999) and Erin Brockovich (2000). Similarly, 
whistleblowing legislation was being enacted in countries around the world in the 1990s, and 
given further impetus in the wake of the Enron scandal in the early 2000s.  
Vandekerckhove sees the increased prominence of whistleblowing as a result of a changed 
societal context, namely, globalisation which “designates the totality of demands, barriers, 
risks and opportunities that come along with an intensified - in breadth and depth - 
domination of private capital over society”(19).  This totality is captured in what 
Vandekerckhove labels the globalisation „semantic‟. The term „semantic,‟ says 
Vandekerckhove, following the sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1980), “denotes words gaining 
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their meaning through their connections to other words. Thus a semantic is a network of 
words that refer to one another in a specific way and it is that specific way that turns the 
words into concepts, or words-with-meaning” (2). We constantly produce conceptual 
variation in our interaction with other semantics and thus all semantics evolve, but because 
we need to be able to continue to make meaning of our reality, i.e. to be able to attribute 
significance to events and to rationalise experiences, the variation that is selected will be the 
one that has the potential to stabilize that semantic (3).   
Vandekerckhove‟s project is to trace how certain global trends in legitimising whistleblowing 
policies attempt to stabilize the globalisation semantic, i.e. attempt to eliminate the conflict 
between the organisation and society. He argues that certain legitimisation constructs attempt 
to stabilize this crisis by “containing the conflict between organization and society within the 
organization or within the limited space of a proxy of society” (304). In other words, current 
global trends in legitimising whistleblowing policies attempt to move the debate concerning 
whistleblowing ethics from the larger societal domain into the domain of the organisation, 
which includes proxies of society. Vandekerckhove designates as proxies of society such 
institutions, inter alia, as law enforcement agencies, regulators and Ombudspersons (285).  
Whether that attempt succeeds is answered in section 5 below. We turn first to delineating the 
globalisation semantic, within which we examine one central globalisation concept: the 
network perspective. Thereafter we investigate Vandekerckhove‟s construction of the 
normative legitimisations of whistleblowing policies, before returning to an evaluation of 
whether those legitimisations succeed in eliminating the conflict between society and 
organisation.    
4.1.The globalisation semantic, network perspective and autopoiesis 
The globalisation semantic is comprised of the concepts „stakeholder‟, „flexibility‟, 
„decentralization‟, „governance‟, and „network‟ (Vandekerckhove 2006: 73). 
Vandekerckhove (86) builds on Freeman‟s (1984: 46) definition of stakeholders as “any 
group of or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm‟s 
objectives” to include Rowley‟s (1997) more expansive definition which considers not just 
“dyadic relationships between stakeholders and organizations but also “multiple, 
interdependent and simultaneous interactions in stakeholder environments” (2006: 91).  
Flexibility refers to the structure of an organisation that allows it to adjust to changing 
demands of the market, so that it can respond and reposition its resources accordingly (75). In 
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practice this means employing more temporary workers whose working hours can be scaled 
up or down according to market demand; and constantly moving production around the globe 
to where input costs are lowest. Flexibility requires decentralisation, which is the giving up of 
central decision making (also referred to as „flattening‟ of organisations). This means less 
hierarchical levels which in turn imply that lower-level employees are given more 
discretionary power to make decisions (77). Decentralisation not only occurs within 
organisations, but also at societal level, as in the process of privatization which “can be 
described as society delegating responsibilities to companies and private organisations” (78). 
Decentralisation begets uncertainty which then requires governance. The language of 
governance, as opposed to government, becomes necessary to accommodate the blurring of 
institutional borders between public and private organizations (80). Governance is directed at 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Another way of confronting uncertainty is adopting a „network perspective.‟ Vandekerckhove 
explains that “taking a network perspective on an organization implies focussing on the 
interactions between organizational departments, between individuals within organizational 
departments, and between organizations … the overall pattern of interactions makes up the 
network structure, which is seen as providing opportunities for and constraints on specific 
actions” (82).   The organisational system amounts to “the set of relations between elements, 
but without fixed distances. Hence processes are dynamic” (81). Also, from a network 
perspective, “the locus of rationality shifts from the global to the local” (81).  Adopting a 
network perspective on organisations means that interdependency and cooperation are 
emphasised and “communication and collective action are the key metaphors… rather than 
conflict and competition” (85). 
Vandekerckhove‟s network perspective is based on his understanding of “organizations as 
autopoietic systems” (81), of which he gives no further description. Woermann (2010b: 96-
100) gives an exposition of autopoietic systems as systems that are “autonomous, self-
referential and organisationally closed” (97). She cites Hayles (1999: 136) who explains: 
“living systems operate within the boundaries of an organization that closes in on itself and 
leaves the world on the outside.” Drawing on the work of Maturana and Varela (1980), 
Woermann explains that being organisationally closed does not mean being isolated, but 
rather that the “environment is drawn into the system, in order to facilitate its own production 
and maintenance” (2010b: 97). This production, or rather self-production, occurs through 
feedback loops, in a process called autopoiesis (98). Woermann (98) elaborates, drawing on  
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Maturana and Varela‟s (1980: 9) description of autopoiesis as “ the circularity of its 
organisation that makes a living system a unit of interactions, and it is the circularity that it 
must maintain in order to remain a living system and to retain its identity through different 
interactions.”  
Niklas Luhmann (1995) appropriated Maturana and Varela‟s ideas and applied them to social 
systems. Poli (2009: 9-11) describes how Luhmann achieved this- social systems are self-
referential if they display a degree of systemic stability. Social systems, argued Luhmann, 
reproduced not just by the reproduction of social roles but by the “reproduction of meaning, 
e.g. through education and other socializing functions” (9). As was described above at  the 
start of this section, in what was called a „semantic‟, Luhmann saw the reproduction of 
meaning as occurring through “endogenous processes of variation, selection and 
stabilization” (Vandekerckhove 2006: 3). Social systems, for Luhmann, are informationally 
as opposed to thermodynamically closed, because, argues Poli, (2009: 11) “all the 
communication takes place within the system; there is no communicative exchange between 
the system and its environment.”  The system is however, “able to reproduce the 
system/environment distinction (wherein the environment perturbs the system and triggers 
internal processes) within the system itself” (11).  
 
The notion of autopoietic systems, as operationally closed systems, is however extremely 
problematic, and Woermann doubts whether the solipsistic and relativistic implications they 
carry can be overcome (2010b: 100). This problem is returned to in the last section of this 
chapter. 
 
4.2. Current global normative legitimisations of whistleblowing 
 
Having delineated the concepts which comprise the globalisation semantic - flexibility, 
decentralisation, governance, „stakeholder‟ and „network‟ (a concept which was explored in 
some depth because of what will follow in this subsection) - Vandekerckhove can now 
construct normative legitimisations of whistleblowing policies.  In examining those 
normative legitimisations, particular attention will be paid to how the network perspective, 
understood as an autopoietic system, informs those normative legitimisations. The success or 
failure of a normative legitimisation may well hinge on the understanding of a network as an 
operationally closed system, as opposed to an open system.   
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Vandekerckhove considers the six possible ways in which whistleblowing policies are 
currently normatively legitimised around the globe - through Organizational Social 
Responsibility (OSR)
15
; accountability; integrity; loyalty; efficiency; and whistleblowing as a 
human right (73-136). Whistleblowing as a human right was considered in Chapter 1, Section 
6.1, while the loyalty construct is that contained in „rational loyalty‟ (see Chapter 1, Section 
3.1). Vandekerckhove argues that integrity is the unity of “discernment, action and speaking, 
and that in whistleblowing, this unity [is] present” but as a legitimisation “whistleblowing is 
„raising concern‟ rather than … „making allegations‟”(151).   
 
Whistleblowing policies as a means of getting information about what is going wrong on the 
„shop floor‟ legitimises itself by promoting organisational efficiency (138). This is because 
“organizational processes can be designed as very efficient, but if they are not carried out the 
way they were planned or intended, this causes inefficiency - fraud and corruption” (281). 
The decentralisation of organisations identified in the globalisation semantic above disperses 
power over the organisation, with the result that there is both a greater risk that those 
processes will be thwarted, and that it is more difficult  to determine where things went 
wrong (281). Efficiency driven whistleblowing policies then become governance mechanisms 
which balance flexibility with detectability, as a way to govern the „human factor‟ (281). As 
such, the efficiency legitimation is one of the three most widely used whistleblowing 
legitimisations around the globe today (279). The other two legitimisations widely employed 
are the accountability and OSR-network legitimisations. 
 
Accountability, which includes responsibility, legitimises whistleblowing policies, in that 
within the decentralised organisation, it makes lower managers answerable to their superiors 
for their actions (114). In so doing it also protects the subordinates of those managers from 
internal office politics and those manager‟s subjective whims (115). A whistleblowing policy 
“as an accountability mechanism is assigning a position to particular agents in a chain of 
accountability” (282). This is usually achieved by adopting a tiered approach. A tiered 
approach acts as a „filtering mechanism‟ which allows an organisation control over its 
                                                          
15 Vandekerckhove uses the term Organizational Social Responsibility instead of the more commonly used 
Corporate Social Responsibility to make explicit the idea that social responsibility is applicable to both 
corporate and non-corporate actors (2006:104).
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practices as long as they stay in line with the public interest as defined in the subject element 
(283). Vandekerckhove continues (284):                 
It is only when organizations refuse or are unable to solve problems regarding their 
own practices that disclosure can be made to a next-level recipient. At this second 
level, it is a proxy of society - a governmental control agency such as a law 
enforcement agency, a specially designed investigation agency, or an agency under 
parliamentary control such as an ombudsperson - who judges the alleged 
organizational malpractice - again, relative to the public interest as specified in the 
subject element. Only in a few cases there is a third level, where society can judge the 
organizational practice in question when a disclosure is made to the media … hence 
the tiered approach allows disclosures in the public interest to be made but not or only 
indirectly to the public.  
Vandekerckhove argues that the accountability legitimisation is widely used today, because it 
“stabilizes the globalisation semantic by conceptualizing whistleblowing in a way that 
reduces the risk of organizational practices to come under judgement or direct control of 
society” (284). The problems surrounding this tiered approach, which can be attributed to 
understanding networks as autopoietic systems, are discussed in the next subsection on the 
OSR-network legitimisation. 
The OSR-network legitimisation is also widely employed around the globe today for a 
similar reason, which we discuss below. Vandekerckhove constructs two normative 
legitimisations of whistleblowing around OSR: 1). OSR and the network perspective, and 2). 
OSR, Stakeholders and purpose, which we examine in turn.    
 
 4.2.1. The OSR-network legitimisation 
Vandekerckhove builds his OSR-network legitimisation around Calton and Lad‟s (1995) 
paper Social contracting as a trust-building process of network governance.  In neo-classical 
economic theory market transactions are conceived of as dyadic (once off, two-party) 
transactions (274). Calton and Lad argue for a conception of networks “as an emerging 
alternative to market transactions and hierarchical governance” (1995: 274.) More 
specifically, “social contracting within networks is, essentially, an interactive, participant-
driven, developmental trust-building process [which] works to create and sustain a durable 
and resilient basis for effective and efficient organizational interaction by minimizing the 
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moral hazard of participant opportunism”(274). Trust, being “the essential glue and lubricant 
for long-term, value-creating organizational interactions” (274), is thus at the heart of 
network governance, especially “in the absence of formal, explicit governance mechanisms 
that safeguard against malfeasance” (282). 
However, because of the information asymmetry between an organisation and its 
stakeholders, or between various departments and/or individuals within the organisation, trust 
between the network participants can only be maintained if the “problem of unequal power 
within relational contracts” can be equitably resolved (283). Calton & Lad‟s solution to this 
problem is to promote “a consent-based, dialogue-driven, micro social-contracting process of 
collaborative governance” (284). To facilitate this requires “a recasting of managerial 
discretion into a new form of „moral agency‟” (286) which they identify with Carol Gilligan‟s 
(1982) „ethic of care‟16.  An ethic of care eschews applying universal rules of justice in 
balancing stakeholder interests (Calton & Lad 1995: 288). Instead, maintaining trust-based 
network-relationships “calls for a more particularist application of discretion as an agent‟s 
responsibility to serve the interests of network participants. Trusted long-term customers, 
employees, and suppliers expect special consideration, not standard procedural responses” 
(288) (Italics in original).   
Trust however, can only guarantee so much. Although we can agree with Ghoshal (2005) that 
the „gloomy vision‟ of individuals as Homo Economicus - purely self-interested maximizers  
- that pervades so much of economic and business life, ultimately impoverishes and destroys 
good management practices, we should not overcorrect by assuming that opportunism and 
even duplicity are always, or mostly, exceptional occurrences in corporations.  
It is at this point that Vandekerckhove brings in whistleblowing as a mechanism that can 
ensure and maintain trust between the various stakeholders and the organisation, and between 
the corporate members within the organisation, by resolving the power differentials between 
all these various actors. The organisation naturally exerts an asymmetrical power over its 
                                                          
16 Gilligan uses the metaphor of ‘voice’ to describe the difference between male and female approaches to and 
traditions of morality. The ‘voice’ traditionally associated with women speaks primarily of relationships and the 
responsibilities those relationships give rise to, which she designates as an ‘ethic of care’. The patriarchal 
‘voice’ on the other hand, which Gilligan calls an  ‘ethic of justice’ is “geared to arriving at an objectively fair or 
just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which all rational persons could agree …” (1982:149).   
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employees, and as controller of its operations and the propriety information it generates it 
also tends to exert an asymmetrical power in relation to its stakeholders. These asymmetrical 
power relations are not necessarily abusive, but what is needed are “institutional structures 
that serve the function of monitoring and enforcing the terms of the implicit contract” 
(Vandekerckhove 2006: 106).  A whistleblowing policy is such an institutional structure, and  
“if power is to be balanced through an enhanced flow of information then it is likely that 
those network agents currently deprived of relevant information will be stipulated as 
recipients” (2006: 148).  
This is necessary because “asymmetry of information implies that relevant information is 
generated, but does not get to the appropriate receiver. By specifying the recipient element
17
, 
network actors are empowered to receive information which otherwise would not get to 
them” (148).  Specifying particular stakeholders or corporate members in an organisation as 
appropriate recipients of information also channels information to those recipients, instead of 
allowing any random stakeholder or corporate member to receive it, who might then choose 
to hide or manipulate that information to their benefit if they were opportunistically or 
maliciously inclined. As an example, let us take a corporation that has a certain, higher, rate 
of tax on its profits above a certain threshold. In order to remain below that threshold, and 
avoid the higher tax rate, the corporation purchases equipment that is strictly speaking 
unnecessary for its current operations and size. Only the corporation will know that the 
purchase is unnecessary, but if information regarding the procurement policies, or 
depreciation periods of equipment, were made known to certain stakeholders, such as the 
local municipality, then that impropriety - tax avoidance - could be stopped. If that 
information was passed onto, or ended up with, the corporation‟s trade union for example, the 
union could use that information to extract greater wage concessions; or if that information 
was received by the organisation‟s suppliers, those suppliers could extort higher prices for 
materials or equipment it supplied the organisation.    
The problem, however, with specifying the recipients and positioning them within a network, 
is that the crisis at the heart of the globalisation semantic, the conflict between society and the 
organisation, is evaded rather than solved (284). This is because the OSR network 
legitimisation contains that conflict within the organisation or within the limited space of a 
                                                          
17
 ‘Specifying the recipient element’ refers to who can legitimately receive a disclosure of wrongdoing. See 
Chapter 1, S2.     
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proxy of society, such as a regulator or an Ombudsperson, which it does by adopting a tiered 
recipient approach, which we discussed above.  
The problems associated with a tiered approach however, mirror exactly the problem of 
defining whistleblowing as internal or external disclosure (See Chapter 1, Section 3.3), i.e. 
the superior that one attempts to disclose to may ignore or thwart these attempts, and 
approaching a proxy of society such as an Ombudsperson places a heavy burden on the 
whistleblower to procure evidence. It also exposes the whistleblower to potential 
organisational retaliation.  The tiered approach in theory then seems to grant the 
whistleblower more power, but in practice, the final tier of the media is so far removed as to 
render its protection almost null.  The problem can be traced directly to understanding 
networks as autopoietic systems - by containing the disclosure within the organisation, or a 
proxy of society such as a regulator or an Ombudsperson, the organisation draws those 
proxies into its network such that there can be no communicative exchange between the 
organisation and its environment, or the whistleblower and the would-be recipient. The 
network as operationally closed makes the distinction between the organisation and the other 
tiered recipients - the proxies of society - irrelevant, making the mechanism impotent.     
A possible solution then seems obvious - there should be no restrictions on the 
whistleblowing recipients. How this is achieved is explored by Vandekerckhove in his OSR-
stakeholder legitimisation, to which we now turn. 
4.2.2. The OSR-stakeholder legitimisation 
Vandekerckhove builds his OSR-stakeholder legitimisation around business purpose. Under 
the OSR-stakeholder legitimisation whistleblowing aims at “stakeholders warning other 
stakeholders about organizational practices differing from organizational purpose” (157). He 
agrees with Solomon (1993) that the purpose of business is “to enrich society as well as the 
pockets of those who are responsible for the enriching” (1993: 181). Enrich is perhaps a 
troublesome word to use, as its root - rich - has unfortunately become too closely associated 
with money and thus goes against the very spirit Solomon argues for. A much better 
definition, to my mind, comes from Painter-Morland (2008: 237) who argues that the purpose 
of business is “the enhancement of life.”  
Nonetheless we can continue with Solomon‟s thesis which Vandekerckhove (2006: 107) 
elaborates on - distinguishing between goals and purposes - “business as a practice has a 
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purpose, and goals are internal to the practice.” Thus, taking the national lottery as an 
example, we could say that its goal would be to maximise the sales of its lottery tickets and 
so increase its profits, but its purpose is to distribute those profits back to local charities. 
Unfortunately however, as evidenced by the Enron scandal of the early 2000s and the Global 
Financial crisis of 2007-9, we see how often business goals usurp business purpose; the 
pursuit of profits at all costs destroying the society it is meant to serve and mutilating the life 
it is meant to enhance. 
It is within this disjuncture that Vandekerckhove, rightly, constructs the OSR-stakeholder 
legitimisation of whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is legitimate because society needs to be 
warned when business goals override business purposes; when an organisation‟s goals start to 
have an adverse impact on society (108). This way of putting things recalls Vandekerckhove 
and Commers‟ (2004) notion of rational loyalty (Chapter 1, Section 3.1) which posits 
organisational wrongdoing as any action, emanating from the „physicality‟ of an organisation 
- the management structures, functional positions etc. which is in violation of the explicit 
mission statement of the organisation, whose legitimacy is sanctioned by society. 
Vandekerckhove brings the stakeholder concept into his OSR-stakeholder legitimisation, thus 
differentiating it from the rational loyalty construct, by arguing that in the sense that “the 
abstract notion of „society‟ can be concretized into the stakeholders of an organization ... the 
well-being of society requires organizational practices coinciding with organizational 
purpose” (Vandekerckhove 2006:148) (emphasis added). 
What follows from this, argues Vandekerckhove, is that information must be allowed to be 
disclosed to all stakeholders (148). The distinction between the OSR-network and OSR-
stakeholder legitimisations is that the former “identifies which stakeholders are part of the 
organizational network and assigns them a position and importance” while the latter “do not 
specify which stakeholders are to be regarded as relevant, but instead allows disclosures to be 
made to a wide range of stakeholders; in the limit to the whole of society” (149). In other 
words, instead of understanding an organisational network as a closed, autopoietic system, 
the organisation must be made completely open to its environment.  
It is at this stage that we must recall Jubb‟s definition of whistleblowing (Chapter1, Section 
2.1), specifically the part, “disclosure … to an external entity having the potential to rectify 
the wrongdoing”, as well as the problems we associated with this requirement (Chapter 1, 
Section 5). The problem was that even if the would-be whistleblower did have the requisite 
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access to the incriminating evidence, the whistleblower might not have been able to convince 
a reasonable impartial observer that the organisational action in question did in fact amount to 
wrongdoing and pose a potential harm, because of the highly technical or scientific nature of 
the evidence. In other words, the OSR-stakeholder legitimisation can make disclosure less 
effective if such disclosure is made, say, to the media, “who is only interested in reporting the 
wrongdoing, not correcting it” (Vandekerckhove 2006: 312). It is better to disclose to an 
organisation that can interpret and analyse the evidence and so make a more informed 
judgement on whether wrongdoing has been committed and the likely extent of the harm to 
follow. Opening up the organisational network wholesale does not therefore present a totally 
satisfactory solution to the problems associated with organisational networks understood as 
autopoietic systems.   
What is needed then perhaps is a hybrid of the OSR-network and OSR-stakeholder 
legitimisations. Vandekerckhove believes this is possible if the tiered approach of the OSR-
network and accountability legitimisations is adopted and 1) the final tier is left open, i.e. 
disclosures to the media are allowed, 2) there are no extra criteria put on the whistleblower 
when disclosing to these open-tier recipients,
18
 3) cases in court are on public record (312).  
The problem though, which we identified at the end of Section 4.2.1, is that even without 
these restrictions, a tiered approach still faces the same problems as those facing a more 
traditional external/internal disclosure dichotomy (See Chapter 1, Section 3.3). Another 
solution advanced by Vandekerckhove is enlisting civil society, instantiated in NGOs, the 
media and trade unions, which can act as a „midway‟ within the tiers between the 
organisation and proxies of society (312). NGOs which, because they are “parcels of society, 
constituted by those who care for a particular issue” (Vandekerckhove 2003) rather than 
proxies of society, avoid the conflict between society and the organisation (Vandekerckhove 
2006: 312). NGOs and trade unions can develop know-how to interpret whistleblowing 
information and put pressure on organisations to correct wrongdoing because they have the 
resources and liberty to involve the media (312).  However, Vandekerckhove anticipates a 
problem, which he describes as a paradox, a paradox similar to that identified by De Maria 
                                                          
18
 An example of the extra criteria Vandekerckhove is referring to can be found in S.9 of the South African PDA. 
S.9 stipulates that a general protected disclosure, i.e. one not made to recipients as specified in Sections 5-8, is 
a protected disclosure only if i)the employee believes he/she will be subjected to occupational detriment 
(S.9(2)(a)); and/or ii)  there is no prescribed body/person in relation to the relevant impropriety or the 
employee believes the employer will destroy or conceal evidence relating to the impropriety(S.9(2)(b)); and/or 
iii) the employee has made a previous disclosure to his/her employer or specified recipient and no action was  
taken after a reasonable time had elapsed after the disclosure(S.9(3)(c)). 
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(2005) concerning whistleblowing within the African and South African context (see Section 
3.2 above). The paradox for Vandekerckhove “lies in the fact that openness of the recipient 
element requires as well as makes a strong civil society” (2006: 313).  He elaborates further:  
Whistleblowing policies need to apply a broad scope to their actor, subject and 
recipient elements. However, to make such a broad policy effective - given problems 
of asymmetry of information - one needs to assume an organizational and societal 
„culture‟ characterized by the absence of abuse of power in highly independent and 
transparent organizations. However, to assume such a „culture‟ annuls the need for 
whistleblowing.  
The outlines of a possible resolution to this paradox is offered in the next section and fully 
fleshed out in the next chapter. 
5. The network perspective as an autopoietic system fails to stabilise the globalisation 
semantic 
Vandekerckhove (2006: 304) argues that, to the extent that “the semantic constructs used to 
legitimate those [whistleblowing] policies - stabilize the globalisation semantic … [it] implies 
that the concepts of flexibility, decentralization, governance, network and stakeholder 
maintain relevance in our meaning-making”. The problems identified above with the network 
perspective, as contained in the OSR (organisational social responsibility) whistleblowing 
legitimisation, indicate that the concept „network‟ (in Vandekerckhove‟s sense) might not be 
maintaining relevance in our meaning-making and thus cannot stabilize the globalisation 
semantic. In other words, the network perspective as argued for by Vandekerckhove does not 
satisfactorily eliminate the conflict between the organisation and society because it does not 
reconcile the opposing meanings emanating from whistleblowing‟s essential aporia - 
organisational loyalty versus preventing public harm.  
 
Vandekerckhove bases his understanding of the network perspective, and the legitimisations 
that follow, on networks as autopoietic systems. The problem seems to lie in the fact that 
organisational networks, as operationally closed systems, cannot satisfactorily deal with the 
openness required in the recipient element. On the other hand, opening up the organisational 
network completely to its environment leads to other problems - such as stakeholders who 
receive information but who then, due to a lack of expertise, cannot effect any changes as a 
consequence of receiving that information. 
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Critical Complexity theory, like the theory of autopoietic systems, also focuses on the 
interactions in the system but crucially, is not operationally closed. Critical Complexity 
theory allows the system to generate meaning only if the system remains open to its 
environment. Critical Complexity does not however require that that system be completely 
open - if it was completely open then there would be no way to distinguish between the 
system and its environment. Critical Complexity will allow the organisation and 
organisational network to be understood as an open system that is nonetheless still bounded. 
Critical Complexity, it will be argued in the next chapter, will allow the concept of „network‟ 
to maintain relevance in our meaning-making and so stabilize the globalisation semantic i.e. 
eliminate the conflict between the organisation and society. An exposition of Critical 
Complexity and the ethics of Critical Complexity will be undertaken in Chapter 3.  
Critical Complexity will also allow us to posit a resolution to Vandekerckhove‟s paradox by 
conceiving of organizational and social identity as coterminous, i.e. that the identity of the 
whistleblower as parrhesiastes is not ontologically prior to the identity of the corporation 
and/or civil society.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The shifts in understanding, and legitimising of whistleblowing over the last thirty years 
marks an attempt to understand whistleblowing as a historically determined and culturally 
mediated social practice within the context of globalisation. We saw that trends in 
legitimising whistleblowing attempted to eliminate the conflict between society and 
organisation, manifesting as organisational wrongdoing harming the public interest, by trying 
to contain that conflict within the organisation, or a proxy of society. Society opts not to exert 
direct control over the organisation and its practices, but instead to mediate its influence over 
organisations through various governmental agencies as well as legislation.  
 
Ultimately, this compromise has proven unsatisfactory. Globally, whistleblowing still 
remains a highly problematic issue, in so far as organisational retaliation against the 
whistleblower has not been eliminated, and the internal/external disclosure issue has not been 
resolved. The conflict between society and the organisation over organisational wrongdoing 
remains. Locally, within the South African context, whistleblowers are in an even more 
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precarious position. The historical weight against those who disclose seems to be becoming 
more burdensome as our society moves into a politics of suspicion. 
 
Our analysis has showed that one of the principal reasons for these failures is conceiving of 
the organisation and the stakeholders in its environment - the network perspective - as an 
operationally closed system. This conception leads directly to the problems and paradoxes 
involved in opening up the recipient element. These were that stakeholders who, due to lack 
of expertise, could not action the information contained in the disclosure and the fact that 
encouraging whistleblowing needs an open and democratic society, but that whistleblowing 
itself contributes to an open and democratic society. What is needed is a conception of the 
network as an open system. It was briefly outlined that critical complexity theory can 
conceive of an organisational network in this manner. We now turn to a full exposition of 
Critical Complexity and show how, by allowing us to reconceptualise the whistleblower as 
parrhesiastes, Critical Complexity can resolve the conflict between society and the 
organisation.  
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Chapter 3:  Reconceptualising the whistleblower in a complex world 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined whistleblowing as a historically determined and socially 
mediated practice, which came unstuck when we enlisted Vandekerckhove‟s analysis of 
whistleblowing within the context of globalisation of the last thirty years. The principal 
weakness in Vandekerckhove‟s analysis, it was argued, was his conception of organisations, 
and networks of organisations, as autopoietic systems, i.e. operationally closed systems. 
Vandekerckhove‟s‟ legitimisation strategy aimed to eliminate the conflict between society 
and the organisation by containing that conflict within the organisation. In this chapter we 
attempt to recast that conflict by a reconceptualisation of the whistleblower, with the 
organisation conceived of as an open system at the heart of that reconceptualisation. What 
follows from that reconceptualisation is that the distinction between internal and external 
disclosure becomes inconsequential, while the central dilemma of whistleblowing loyalty is 
dissolved.  
The chapter starts by introducing Critical Complexity theory, which posits that the properties 
of complex systems emerge from the interactions between the systems‟ components which 
form the system in a self-organising process.  A complex system is constrained by the 
boundaries with its environment which cannot be clearly defined. Defining such boundaries 
is a function of the system and a function of a framing strategy, which always leaves some 
features of the system out in order to reduce the complexity and model the system. Framing 
has important implications for our knowledge of complex systems, which are explored in the 
remainder of Section 2. Section 2 is thus descriptive and serves as the theoretical 
underpinning to Section 3 which goes on to make the claim that organisations can be 
understood as complex systems. I examine how the identity of corporations and corporate 
members emerge through cooperative and competitive activities in the workplace which 
coalesce into „iterative themes‟, which, in a process of „normative congruence‟ bound the 
organisation‟s purpose and identity. This understanding of corporate identity then affects how 
we understand corporate responsibility, which is presented as a notion of „relational 
responsiveness‟. 
Section 4 then applies these insights directly to the ethics of whistleblowing, primarily as a 
means to render the distinction between internal and external disclosure as obsolete. 
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Reframing organisational boundaries also encompasses individual corporate members 
reframing their corporate roles and thus the extent of their responsibilities. Section 5 extends 
the reframing of the organisation‟s boundaries to encompass the bigger boundary issue 
between society and the organisation. The contentious nature of the boundary between 
society and the organisation is revealed in the uneasy relation between business and ethics. 
Despite some theorists‟ claims, most notably that of Milton Friedman (1970), that the only 
responsibility of business is to make profits, society has intervened in this regard. In the wake 
of corporate scandals such as Enron it has attempted to institutionalise ethics in the 
organisation. This attempt has failed to stop corporate wrongdoing and thus the conflict 
between society and the organisation persists. The final part of this chapter employs Critical 
Complexity to conceive of „business ethics as practice‟ (instead of business ethics as rules 
and universal, immutable principles) which in the instance of the whistleblower as 
parrhesiastes, aims to demonstrate that the act of whistleblowing is an act of loyalty to both 
the organisation and society simultaneously. 
2. Critical Complexity
19
  
We commence our exposition of Critical Complexity  with a quote: “Complexity is not 
something that can be pinned down by analysing the properties of a certain part of the system 
or by taking the components of the system apart and seeking for traces of complexity within 
the isolated parts” (Preiser & Cilliers 2010: 266). Complexity arises because of the 
interaction between the components of a system and the interaction between those 
components and the system‟s environment; a complex system is constituted through both the 
sum of its components and the relationships between those components and the relationships 
between those components and its environment (Cilliers 1998: 2). 
Before continuing my exposition I need to note the distinction between systems that are 
complex from those that are merely complicated (3), such as the brain versus the space 
shuttle. The latter can in principle be given an exact description, while the former resists the 
analytical method. Cilliers acknowledges that this distinction can sometimes be difficult to 
draw and depends on the state of our present knowledge - what is considered complex today, 
                                                          
19
 Cilliers (2010) develops a critical theory of complexity, which against other forms of complexity, does not 
harbour the hope of finding essentialist descriptions of reality. He cites Edgar Morin’s (2007) distinction 
between ‘restricted’ and general’ theories of complexity; the former which “acknowledges the relational 
nature of complex systems, but hopes that essential characteristics of these systems can be positively 
identified”, and the latter which avoid this reductionism (Cilliers 2010: 4). Cilliers’ theory of Critical Complexity 
is thus identifiable with Morin’s ‘general’ complexity.  
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might tomorrow, with the aid of some new technology, be revealed as merely complicated 
(Cilliers 2008: 44). Despite the possibility of this epistemological, as opposed to ontological, 
complexity (complexity as a function of our descriptions as opposed to inherent 
characteristics of the system), “given the finitude of human understanding, some aspects of a 
complex system may always be beyond our grasp” (45).  Nonetheless complex systems tend 
to share certain characteristics, as identified by Paul Cilliers (1998: 3-4):  
2.1.The characteristics of a complex system 
1). Complex systems consist of a large amount of elements. Systems with a small amount of 
elements can usually be described in conventional, analytical terms (3). 
2). The elements must interact with one another and the interaction must be dynamic. There 
is thus a temporal dimension to all complex systems (4).  
3). The interactions between the components are fairly rich. This means that any element in 
the system influences and is influenced by many other elements (3-4).  
4). The interactions are non-linear. This means that the system cannot be compressed, and 
represented by a smaller, equivalent system.  It also means that “small causes can have large 
results and vice-versa” (4). This characteristic has implications for how we model complex 
systems, which we discuss below. 
5). The interactions usually have a short range. Elements of a system usually interact with 
other immediately neighbouring elements, although long-range interaction is not precluded. 
More importantly, wide-ranging systemic influence is still possible (4).  
6). There are loops in the interactions. The “effect of any activity can feed back on itself, 
sometimes directly, sometimes after a number of intervening stages” (4). 
7). Complex systems are usually open systems. This means that a complex system interacts 
with its environment. Usually, where the system ends and the environment begins cannot be 
definitively demarcated. Describing a complex system thus involves a framing strategy, 
which depends in part on the purpose the observer of the system intends it for (4). The 
marking off and function of boundaries in complex systems is dealt with in depth in the next 
subsection. 
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8). Complex systems operate under conditions of disequilibrium.  A system under 
homeostasis would not be able to respond to its environment. That the system is in constant 
flux is necessary for the capability of self-organization as the system seeks to adapt to 
changes in its environment (4).    
9). Complex systems have a history. They evolve over time and their past activity and 
interaction co-determines the present state of system (4). A system must be able to „learn‟ 
from past experience and previous encounters if it is to be able to adapt and reconfigure itself 
to new and ever-changing demands made by its environment (92.) However, in order for the 
system to sustain itself, “at least part of the system [must change] at a slower rate than 
changes in the environment” (Cilliers 2005: 257). This part functions as the „memory‟ of the 
system.  
10). Each element in the system is ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole, 
responding only to information that is available to it locally. This point can be tied to point 5 
above. More importantly, “if each element „knew‟ what was happening to the system as a 
whole, all of the complexity would have to be present in that element” (Cilliers 1998: 4-5). 
These characteristics lead to some interesting features which are commonly associated with 
complex systems, most notably the ability of self-organisation, which enables complex 
systems “to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and adaptively in order to 
cope with, or manipulate, their environment” (1998: 90). Self-organisation is “a process 
whereby a system can develop a complex structure from fairly unstructured beginnings” (12). 
Crucially, this structure “can evolve without the intervention of an external designer or the 
presence of some centralised form of internal control” (89).  
The interactions also produce the „emergent‟ properties of the system, “the higher order 
properties which make the system what it is” (Cilliers 2010: 4). As an example, Cilliers cites 
the property of consciousness which emerges from the interactions between the neurons in 
the brain (5). Emergence should not, however, be viewed as a passive product of interactions 
(Woermann 2010a: 170). The presence of feedback loops as identified above in point 6 
ensures that “the products and the effects are at the same time causes and producers of what 
produces them” (Morin 2008: 49). From the interactions also emerge the system‟s structure, 
comprising boundaries and hierarchies. How these boundaries and hierarchies emerge is 
explored in detail in the following subsection.  
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2.2. Structure, boundaries and hierarchies  
The interactions between the components of a complex system are also asymmetrical, which 
is “another way of stating that the relationships between the components are relationships of 
difference” (Cilliers 2010: 7). Difference is necessary for any interesting behaviour to arise, 
indeed, “without difference there can be no meaning” (7).  However there needs to be an 
“economy of difference”: not unlimited difference, but bounded difference (8). Another way 
of saying this is that in order for a system to behave in complex ways there must be neither 
too little, nor too much structure (Cilliers 2008: 46).  
Complexity, argues Cilliers (2010: 15), “is not simply a function of the interactions between 
many components, but of their organisation.” If there is too little structure the system risks 
becoming a mere reflection of its environment, changing chaotically in response to every 
perturbation, no matter how small.  “Complex behaviour is only possible when the behaviour 
of the system is constrained” (Cilliers 2008: 46). However, too much structure and the system 
becomes rigid, incapable of complex behaviour either (46). This is because if it is too tightly 
constrained it will not be able to adapt to its changing environment. 
Constraints, however, should not be seen as something negative, they are also enabling, 
argues Cilliers (2001: 139). Elsewhere, Cilliers (2010: 10) elaborates on this point: “The 
fewer constraints, the more possibility, but possibility left empty. The more constraints, the 
better we can get at the meaning, but the more bountiful it is.”  Constraints “provide a 
framework that enables descriptions to be built up around it” (Cilliers 2001: 139).  
Constraints can be understood as that which bounds a system, which in turn can be equated 
with the structure of that system. 
In order to differentiate one system from another there needs to be some kind of boundary. 
However, because complex systems are open systems, deciding where or how to draw the 
boundary between one system and the next, or one system and its environment, becomes 
problematic (Cilliers 2001: 140). Boundaries are “simultaneously a function of the activity of 
the system itself, and a product of the strategy of description involved” (141).  The problem 
however is that because “we can never be sure that we have „found‟ or „defined‟ [the 
boundary of the system] clearly … the closure20 of the system is not something that can be 
                                                          
20
 Cilliers (2010: 140) maintains that it is acceptable, when dealing with complex systems in an ‘operational’ 
way, to introduce ‘operational closure’ as a way of dealing with the problems of boundaries, as is the strategy 
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described objectively” (141).   Instead, Cilliers urges us to understand boundaries not as 
something which separates things from one another, but rather as “something that constitutes 
that which is bounded” (141). This shift in perspective allows us to see boundaries as 
enabling instead of confining (141). 
Further impoverishing our notion of boundaries is our propensity to visualise complex 
systems as contiguous in space, thinking of systems in an „organistic‟ manner (141). Social 
systems, however, may be composed of parts existing in different spatial locations. Indeed, 
the parts may be located in virtual space (142). One only has to think of the obvious example 
of the social networking website Facebook, to understand this. An important consequence of 
this way of understanding boundaries is that “non-contiguous subsystems could be part of 
many systems simultaneously” (142). Thus, within the virtual system that constitutes 
Facebook, there are many smaller communities which usually form around a particular social 
cause, or trend. These virtual communities, or subsystems, are also simultaneously parts of 
other systems, which are other social networking sites, such as Linked-In. Under these 
conditions, locating the „place‟ of the boundary thus becomes a futile exercise.  
A further implication of a non-spatial understanding of boundaries is that in a complex 
system “we are never far away from the boundary … there will always be a short route from 
any component to the „outside‟ of the system … there is no safe „inside‟ the system … 
everything is always interacting and interfacing with others and with the environment; the 
notions of „inside‟ and „outside‟ are never simple or uncontested” (142).  
Just like boundaries, systems need, and produce hierarchies. Hierarchies allow asymmetry 
into the structure of a system (143). Asymmetry is closely related to non-linearity (Cilliers 
1998: 120) and operates as a mechanism “to exploit the magnifying power of non-linearity” 
(120). However, viewing hierarchies as clearly defined and permanent becomes problematic 
(as was the case with boundaries). In the classical understanding, hierarchies are seen as 
„nested‟, but in reality, hierarchies, argues Cilliers, „interpenetrate‟ each other - “there are 
relationships which cut across different hierarchies” (2001: 143). These interpenetrations can 
be so extensive that it becomes impossible to distinguish which part of the system is 
subordinate to which (143). Instead of viewing these interpenetrations as „messy‟ but 
unavoidable, Cilliers invites us to see them as indispensable to the adaptability of the system 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
employed in autopoiesis (see Chapter 2, Section 4.1.1). For our purposes, as identified in Chapter 2, Section 5, 
this will not do.  
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(143). Interpenetrations allow cross-communication between hierarchies which is necessary if 
dominant or obsolete hierarchies are to be dislodged (143). Hierarchies cannot remain 
unchanged - they must change as the context of the system changes. Transforming hierarchies 
does not necessarily always entail their destruction, though. A shift, changing an existing 
hierarchy into a different one, is sufficient enough to ensure the vitality of the system (144).  
With the nature of boundaries and hierarchies in mind we can now turn to the difficult task of 
modelling complex systems. As we mentioned above, the demarcation of a boundary or a 
hierarchy is a function both of the system and the description we choose to give that system. 
Systems are thus identifiable as one particular system rather than another, not because of 
some a priori identity, but because of the framing strategy we choose to employ in describing 
that system.  
2.3. Describing and framing complex systems: the ethics of Critical Complexity 
When we decide to model a complex system, in order to “frame our description, we have to 
decide what our „distance‟ from the system will be: in other words, what level of detail are 
we going to consider?” (Cilliers 1998: 5). For example, in describing the organisation as a 
complex system do we consider the detail of the micro-level - the individual employee within 
the organisation, the meso-level - the organisation as a whole interacting with other 
organisations, or the macro-level - organisations within the economic system and society? 
We will in the course of this chapter consider all three levels. Different descriptions will 
decompose the system in different ways and “the knowledge gained by any description is 
always relative to the perspective from which the description was made” (Cilliers 2008: 46). 
But in order for our descriptions to be functional as models, and not be mere repetitions of the 
system, those models have to reduce the complexity of the system (Preiser & Cilliers 2010: 
269). Some aspects of the system will be left out when we choose one particular description, 
other aspects when we choose another description but, ultimately there is no “a priori 
procedure for deciding which description is correct” (Cilliers 2008: 46). Any and all 
descriptions of a system will thus always result in some characteristic of that system being 
excluded.  
The problem arises then that, because of non-linearity, we cannot predict how that which we 
choose to leave out will impact upon the system - “something that may appear to be 
unimportant now may turn out to be vitally important later. Or vice versa, of course” (Cilliers 
2001: 138). What we leave “out interacts with the rest of the system in a non-linear way and 
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we cannot, therefore, predict what the effects of our reduction of the complexity will be, 
especially not as the system and its environment develops and transforms in time” (Cilliers 
2005: 258). Nonetheless, we cannot step outside complexity- we cannot know everything all 
at once, we are „rationally bounded‟ - we have to choose our frameworks (259). Framing thus 
becomes an ethical act - “there is always a normative dimension to the claims we make, and 
we have to stand in for them” (Preiser & Cilliers 2010: 270). 
To choose not to choose is also a choice, and is therefore not a viable strategy, argues 
Cilliers, de Villiers & Roodt (2002: 12): 
We are doomed to make choices; [however,] the choices we make cannot be purely 
arbitrary. The complexity we are trying to understand is not featureless. There are 
patterns and structures that constrain our descriptions. We cannot find a pure 
description, and at the same time we cannot just come up with any description. The 
strategy behind the description forms part of the description. Since our descriptions 
are never purely objective, we are responsible for them. (Emphasis added).   
What follows from the above considerations is that we have to accept that our knowledge of 
complex systems will always be provisional (Cilliers 2005: 259). “As the context in which 
this knowledge is to be useful changes, we will have to continually revise the framework 
which generated this knowledge” (Preiser & Cilliers 2010: 269).  Our knowledge of complex 
systems will thus always be limited. However, argues Cilliers, (2005: 260) “limited 
knowledge is not equivalent to „any‟ knowledge.” This is an argument against relativism. As 
the quotation from the previous paragraph makes clear - “the complexity we are trying to 
understand is not featureless” - knowledge, although never objective, is nonetheless 
contingent upon, and constrained by context (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, our knowledge of 
complex systems need not be vague. In making truth claims that are able to be differentiated 
from other truth claims, our knowledge becomes intelligible (Cilliers 2005: 262). Therefore, 
argues Cilliers, this modest position - that we can have only limited knowledge of complex 
systems - is not a weak position, but a responsible position (262). 
This modest position has an important consequence in regard to our actions. If our decisions 
are necessarily based on limited knowledge, then the information we can marshal in weighing 
up a particular course of action will always be incomplete (Preiser & Cilliers  2010: 270). 
Action then, becomes more than just a choice, but a wager (Morin 2008: 54). This wager 
involves “an awareness of risk and uncertainty” because our “actions escape our intentions 
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[because of non-linearity: J.A. Andrade] … and often the action will fly back at our heads 
like a boomerang” (55). Nowhere is this element of risk and uncertainty more clear than in 
the whistleblowing act. The whistleblower intends to arrest corporate malfeasance and be 
hailed as a loyal employee, (Uys 2000) only for the company to ostracise and expel him/her 
from the organisation. Our wagers should then not be reckless and hubristic, or naïve, but the 
outcome of “careful and critical reflection” (Preiser & Cilliers 2010: 271).   
In order to give more substance to these guidelines, Preiser & Cilliers (2010: 274-276) 
develop an ethical strategy along the lines of Kant‟s Categorical imperative (See Chapter 1, 
Section 4.2), which they call the Provisional imperative, turning Kantian logic on its head. 
The Provisional imperative also requires us to adopt a certain attitude but instead of 
proposing an immutable and universal injunction it calls on us to: 
1. justify our actions only in ways which do not preclude the possibility of revising that 
justification, 
2. Make only those choices which keep the possibility of choice open, 
3. Our actions should show a fundamental respect for difference, even as those actions 
reduce it,  
4. Act only in ways which will allow the constraining and enabling interactions between 
the components in the system to flourish (275-276). 
Having mapped out the characteristics and properties of complex systems and ethics of 
Critical Complexity we can now turn to the project of understanding organisations as 
complex systems. 
3. The organisation as a complex system 
In order to understand organisations as complex systems it is useful to draw certain parallels. 
This will be done by mapping certain organisational characteristics onto the ten 
characteristics of complex systems as identified in Section 2.1 above. We will move between 
the level of the organisation and the individual employee as the points call for them. 
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1). Complex systems consist of a large amount of elements. Organisations, specifically Multi-
National Corporations (MNCs), usually have a large amount of employees
21
, and are linked 
with a similarly large amount of other MNCs in global supply chains.  
2). The elements must interact with one another and the interaction must be dynamic. 
Organisations and employees interact by selling and buying, marketing and developing new 
products and services. These relationships change continuously.  
3). The  interactions between the components are fairly rich. Employees interact with many 
other employees, both from their organisation and others. Organisations interact with 
competitors, suppliers, customers, government agencies, the communities within which they 
find themselves, in short, a very diverse stakeholder set. Points 2 & 3 are developed further 
below when we discuss corporate identity. 
4). The  interactions are non-linear. Millions can go into developing and marketing a new 
product, only for it to „flop‟ upon release to the market. Similarly, a small, independently and 
cheaply produced game or movie can go „viral‟ generating huge returns.  
5).The interactions usually have a short range. Employees usually interact with employees 
within their own department, and corporations increasingly „buy local‟ to both save 
transportation costs and to reduce their carbon footprint, which is not to say they do not 
interact with more distant parties. Indeed, in the age of globalisation, corporations compete 
with other corporations all over the globe not only for customers, but for resources and talent. 
Similarly, in the age of e-mail and Skype, interacting with a colleague in another time-zone is 
becoming increasingly common. 
6). There are loops in the interactions. Feedback from the shop floor to management and 
from the board to the coal-face is the crucial driver of efficiency in corporations. It allows the 
corporation to tweak and perfect its products. Efficiency is one of the most widely employed 
legitimisations of whistleblowing today (see Chapter 2, Section 4.2), because it aims to 
control the „human factor‟ in production. The Panoptican effect22 illustrates how the 
                                                          
21
 Wal-Mart, the global retailer, for example, has some 2.1 million employees (which they call ‘associates’) 
worldwide. http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/ (accessed 2 July 2011). 
22
 The term ‘Panoptican’ comes from Jeremy Bentham who proposed designing prisons such that the guards 
could see everything and everyone, without (most importantly) themselves being seen. Because the prisoners 
could never be sure if they were being watched or not, they would be hesitant to commit acts of wrongdoing. 
Foucault (1979) developed the Panoptican vision as a metaphor for the disciplinary society (see footnote 6, 
Chapter 1). 
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complexity principle of recurrency can play out in an organisation.  Employees are made 
responsible for reporting wrongdoing and so, in an attempt to cast off responsibility, report 
any and all suspicions of impropriety to a superior ( See Chapter 1, Section 5).  As a result, a 
climate of distrust develops, which may then feed back into the employee‟s sense of 
themselves (in the eyes of their superiors) as untrustworthy. Feeling thus, the employee may 
then decide that an act of transgression against the organisation is necessary to restore their 
identity, which facilitates, in a process of downward causation, acts of impropriety. Similarly, 
in an opposite scenario, giving recognition to an employee‟s contributions, by say including 
his/her recommendations into a new product or service is likely to feed back into that 
employee‟s morale, who then along with his/her colleagues then invest even more energy into 
coming up with new ideas which are then included in the next version of the product. 
7). Complex systems are usually open systems. An organisation interacts with many 
stakeholders in its environment. This point will form the crux of our analysis in Section 4 
below.   
8). Complex systems operate under conditions of disequilibrium.  An organisation is under 
constant pressure from both internal and external factors - employees leave and are replaced 
by new hires, departments are incorporated into other departments while new departments are 
created. The strategic threats posed from one competitor are countered with a price war, 
while others are co-opted by buying the competition out.  
9). Complex systems have a history. Organisations certainly have a history, constantly 
evolving. Today‟s products depend on yesterday‟s - the smartphone of today incorporates the 
cell-phone, digital camera and internet connectivity of yesterday.  
10). Each element in the system is ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole, 
responding only to information that is available to it locally. A local „no-frills‟ airline will 
lease or purchase more aircraft if there is an increased demand on a particular route, say JHB-
Durban, even if national statistics indicate a decline in overall passenger numbers. 
In addition to the above mapping of the characteristics of a complex system onto an 
organisation, we can also understand some of these characteristics more specifically in 
relation to whistleblowing:  
4) Non-linearity - the lone whistleblower‟s disclosure which results in the company going 
bankrupt, or even precipitating industry wide regulation as was the case with SOX, which 
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was enacted in response to the political fallout from Enron‟s failure (the failure in turn 
exposed in the internal disclosure made  by the whistleblower Sherron Watkins).  
5) Short range interactions - we see that most often in whistleblowing that the whistleblower 
first makes a disclosure to his/her immediate supervisor, although there is always the 
possibility of the quick „jump‟ outside of the organisation to the media. 
9) History -  If an organisation has a history of retaliating against employees who „raise 
concern‟ then it is highly likely that employees observing corporate wrongdoing today will 
turn a blind eye, leading to an organisational culture of „moral silence‟ (see Chapter 1, 
Section 6.2;  cf. Bird 1996). 
While the above exercise of mapping organisational characteristics onto complexity 
characteristics is illuminating, we also need to posit how the corporation‟s identity, as well as 
the identity of individual employees as corporate members, emerges, as an instance of 
complexity, from the interactions between different corporations and the corporation and its 
corporate members.  At this point it is important to note that because of the feedback loops 
within a complex system, “emergence … implies that the identity of systems and components 
are coterminous” (Woermann 2010a: 171). In the context of the organisation this means that 
the identity of the corporation and its corporate members “arise and die together” (168).  
The subsection directly following this one, which delineates a complex notion of corporate 
identity, will be largely descriptive, but will serve two purposes: firstly it will allow us to 
reconceptualise moral agency with direct implications for corporate responsibility. This 
allows us to address the problem identified in Chapter 1, Section 5 which assumed that a 
direct causal relationship between an act of corporate wrongdoing and a particular employee, 
or group of employee‟s could be established, and thus that someone, or some corporate policy 
or procedure could be held responsible; and Chapter 2, Section 4.2.2 which was concerned 
with attributing responsibility such that a whistleblowing disclosure could correct 
organisational wrongdoing. Secondly, and more importantly, delineating a complex notion of 
corporate identity allows us to reconceptualise the notion of the boundaries of the 
organisation which has direct bearing on the central internal/external disclosure dichotomy of 
whistleblowing. This is undertaken in section 4.  
3.1. Identity formation in corporations  
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Difference in the organisation equates to diversity of roles and functions; and in order for an 
organisation to deal with new challenges and a changing environment, it needs to be as 
diverse as possible (Cilliers 2010: 40). We have established that complex identity emerges 
through a process of interaction; therefore an individual‟s identity as a corporate member is 
“delineated within a given work practice” (Westenholz 2004 in Woermann 2010a: 171). 
Corporate identity thus refers to “role identities, constituted by acts and events” (Seabright 
and Kurke 1997 in Woermann 2010a: 171-2). Within the corporation individuals “are 
differentiated from one another on the basis of their membership to „social categories that 
define departments, work units, levels of hierarchy, and/or specialised roles‟” (Paulsen 2003: 
16 in Woermann 2010a: 172). An individual corporate member can therefore have multiple, 
simultaneous group identities. An engineer can thus also be part of management, while a 
typist may belong to an organisational subcommittee that arranges team-building events; an 
employee may belong to one division, such as finance, while also collaborating with another, 
such as marketing, in a special unit constituted to launch a new product.  
Corporations, too, have multiple identities, and are differentiated across many contexts, 
“[meaning] various different things to different stakeholders and groups” (Woermann 2010a: 
172.) A corporation is thus a competitor to a rival in the market but a collaborator with that 
same rival in sponsoring a rural-literacy initiative. A corporation can benefit the local 
community by providing jobs and taxes while also hollowing out the very community those 
workers live and work in by eliminating smaller, local businesses operating in the same 
industry. 
In the course of interacting at work, individual corporate members come to form groups; and 
cooperative and competitive corporate activities lead to the emergence of formal and informal 
collegial relationships, task teams and even corporations in themselves (Woermann 2010a: 
173). Over time group identities and corporate identity, constituted in work practices coalesce 
into “coherent patterns of being-together” (Stacey 2003 in Woermann 2010a: 174). 
Woermann (175) describes these patterns as “iterated themes, which perpetually reconstruct 
the past whilst creating the future.”  The corporation then feeds back these iterative themes 
(constructed out of the patterns emerging from work practices) “in order to produce corporate 
members through policy, culture and purpose” (Woermann 2010a: 175).  In a similar vein, 
Painter-Morland (2008: 174) describes how organisational purpose, or values “emerge as a 
kind of inarticulate pattern or quality in the behaviour and expectations” of corporate 
members, “creating a certain congruence, both in the actions of an individual over time and 
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under different circumstances, and in the behaviour of all those who identify with a particular 
organization. As such, they draw the employees of an organization together in a meaningful 
and significant, but non-coercive way.” Painter-Morland uses the concept of congruence 
instead of consensus because normative congruence captures the organisation‟s “ability to 
accommodate difference and dissensus, without losing its functional unity of purpose or 
sense of identity” (224).  
To recapitulate: corporate identity and the identity of corporate members arise simultaneously 
through “the dynamic interactions between corporate members and subsystems, and by the 
iterative themes and feedback loops which create a sense of normative congruence amongst 
corporate members and subsystems” (Woermann 2010a:  175). How the identity of the 
corporation is perceived has important implications for corporate responsibility, to which we 
now turn.  
3.2. Corporate responsibility, distributed agency and „relational responsiveness‟ 
Woermann (2010a: 177) frames the question of corporate responsibility thus: “can 
corporations be morally responsible for their actions in the same way that individuals are?”  
Traditionally that question has been answered either in the affirmative, by some proponents 
such as French (1979)
23
, or the negative as for example by Ladd (1984)
24
.  Woermann 
(2010a: 177) regards the various definitions of „intentionality‟ within this debate as beside the 
point, identifying instead how both positions share a common, problematic, understanding of 
moral agency  defined by Painter-Morland (2006: 90) as “a direct cause and effect 
relationship between the willing and acting agent and the consequences of his or her 
behaviour”. Furthermore, traditional notions of moral agency assume that “agents, whether 
individual or corporate, make deliberate decisions based on a clear understanding of all 
relevant principles or behavioural guidelines” (Painter-Morland 2008: 225). This conception 
of moral agency led directly to such problems as those identified in Chapter 1, Section 5 
which concerned mandatory whistleblowing (which had the unintended consequence of 
making employees liable for wrongdoing if they could not prove they did not know who was 
responsible for the wrongdoing); and Chapter 2, Section 4.2.2 which was concerned with 
                                                          
23
 French locates corporate agency in a CID structure (Corporations Internal Decision structure) which he 
argues “licenses the predication of corporate intentionality” (1979: 232). 
24
 Ladd argues that attributing moral agency to corporations is not only a category mistake but a moral mistake 
because “corporations are not people but organizations of people” (1984: 249). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
attributing responsibility such that a whistleblowing disclosure could correct organisational 
wrongdoing.  
Our analysis of identity formation in the organisation, understood as a complex system, has 
shown that it is far more fruitful to understand “the locus of moral agency [lying] in the 
reciprocal circuits of influence between individual employees‟ personal moral sensibilities 
and the complex network of relations within an organizational environment” (Painter-
Morland 2006: 93).  Accountability has traditionally been viewed as being accountable for 
something (93) and therefore been focused on “retroactive appropriation of blame” (Painter-
Morland 2008: 226). If instead we understand accountability in terms of the relationships 
within the organisation and the organisation and its environment then we should view our 
responsibilities as responsibility towards others (Painter-Morland 2006: 93). The 
corporation‟s (or corporate member‟s) failure to act appropriately is therefore to fail 
someone, allowing us to understand corporate failures as a breakdown of stakeholder 
relationships (Painter-Morland 2008: 225). 
Understanding accountability in this way thus removes an element identified as crucial to 
whistleblowing - dissent, more particularly accusation (see Chapter 1, Section 3.2). Recall 
that it was this element, identified by Bok (1980) and Jubb (1999), which rendered internal 
disclosure as whistleblowing questionable. However, accountability as relational 
responsiveness eschews apportioning blame.  Let us posit an example of corporate 
wrongdoing, say exceeding permissible pollution emissions, to examine how the focus of the 
disclosure would change under this new conception of accountability.  
Under traditional notions of accountability, the corporation would be responsible for the 
degraded water quality its emissions had produced. It would in all likelihood be fined and 
ordered to reduce its emissions back to the permitted level. Being relationally responsive 
however, would entail seeing the corporation acting responsibly towards particular 
stakeholders. It would be responsible to the local farmers who drew water from that river to 
irrigate their crops; it would be responsible to the visitors of the nature reserve through which 
the river flowed, who came to picnic along its banks. Correcting the failure towards these 
stakeholders would not just entail reducing emissions back to the levels permissible - these 
levels, acceptable for regulatory purposes might not ensure a flourishing or bountiful crop for 
the farmers, or the regulatory levels may technically be safe but produce an unpleasant odour, 
thus destroying the aesthetic appeal of the nature resort.  
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This particular corporate failure could then be seen, in the light of relational responsiveness, 
as not a deliberate policy to exceed, or just meet the threshold level of acceptable emissions, 
but as a failure to engage with those stakeholders - the farmers and nature resort visitors - to 
whom the corporation was responsible. A disclosure of this fact, that it had specifically failed 
the farmers and the nature resort visitors, would thus not be an accusation of the corporation. 
Relational responsiveness would thus facilitate normative congruence - by allowing blame to 
be reconstrued as responsibility, it would allow the corporation to accommodate dissent.  
Let us consider a possible counterargument: we can agree with the strategy outlined above, 
but all that is achieved is that the problem is merely shifted to another level. The corporation 
can agree to be relationally responsive but plausibly maintain that it alone, as opposed to the 
would-be whistleblower who, under this scenario now discloses that stakeholder X is being 
failed, has the prerogative to identify this particular stakeholder as having being let down. 
This move recalls the problem surrounding identifying the subject element of whistleblowing 
(see Chapter 1, Section 2), where the tension manifested in who decided what constituted 
wrongdoing - the organisation or the whistleblower? The problem has been recast, rather than 
resolved.  
A rejoinder to the above counterargument as well as a more general warning concerning 
accountability as „relational responsiveness‟ is necessary at this point: it should not be viewed 
as an endorsement of moral relativism. Corporations and corporate members “are obliged to 
build relationships of trust, confidence, and respect with stakeholders. This imposes 
important limitations on what they can justifiably do” (Painter-Morland 2008: 228).  Trust, 
confidence and respect thus act as constraints on an organisation‟s purpose and work 
practices.  Trust construed as bounding the organisation also ameliorates the problems 
associated with Vandekerckhove‟s OSR-network legitimisation of whistleblowing (Chapter 
2, Section 4.2.1) which attempted to safeguard trust between the corporate members within 
the organisation and the organisation and between the organisation and its environment by 
resolving the power differentials between the various stakeholders and the organisation. 
Resolving those power differentials entailed channelling information to specific recipients 
who were designated in a tiered-approach.    
The problem with that specification was that moving up the tier entailed successively more 
burdensome requirements on the whistleblower - more concrete evidence of wrongdoing for 
example. The root of this problem, it was argued, lay in viewing stakeholder networks as 
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autopoietic systems i.e. operationally closed systems (Chapter 2, Section 5).  We can now 
elaborate on that failure. In allowing disclosure to a proxy of society, such as an 
ombudsperson, the organisation does not so much „open‟ its boundaries as it extends them. 
The boundaries of the organisation widen as it attempts to include parties not „central‟ to its 
operations.   
But the very process of specifying extra requirements on the whistleblower as s/he moves 
progressively through the tiers in attempting to unload his/her disclosure implies that trust is 
not assured and thus that that particular proxy of society is still not inside the organisation‟s 
network. So although the organisation‟s boundaries are wider they are still closed. With the 
insights of Critical Complexity now firmly in mind we can say that the problem with 
boundaries is not how wide they are construed, but how fixed they are. Trust as that which 
bounds the organisation, as opposed to that which tries to resolve power differentials within 
the organisation through a tiered approach, ensures that the boundaries of the organisation 
remain flexible , i.e. relationally responsive to its stakeholder concerns. This also means that 
who qualifies as a recipient of a disclosure of wrongdoing is flexible, dependant on what 
response is required to a particular stakeholder. 
We have demonstrated that our descriptions of complex systems are fallible and thus in 
attempting to describe the organisation, i.e. draw its boundaries, we “could end up harming a 
stakeholder group that did not factor into the particular strategy that we employed when 
demarcating the system” (Woermann 2010a: 177). It has also been demonstrated that where, 
and how, we draw the boundaries of the organisation has profound implications for how we 
conceive the responsibilities of the organisation. We now turn to the implications that 
opening the boundaries of the organisation, and understanding organisational boundaries and 
hierarchies as complex structures, have for whistleblowing. 
 
 
4. Reframing organisational boundaries and the implications for whistleblowing 
In light of our delineation of organisations as complex systems we can say that, in general, 
internal disclosure amounts to understanding the organisation as a closed system, while 
external disclosure allows the organisation to function as an open system. More specifically, 
internal disclosure, because it allows only disclosure to recipients who form part of the 
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organisation, closes the organisation to those would-be recipients not part of the organisation.  
Similarly, external disclosure, by reaching to those recipients not part of the organisation, 
opens the organisation to those recipients.  The crux of the matter, as we have seen, is who 
the organisation decides is „part of it‟, i.e. where it decides it draw its boundaries. More 
importantly, as was argued above, these boundaries must be flexible. Thus extending the 
boundaries of an organisation to include proxies of society, such as an ombudsperson, to 
which a disclosure can be made to, and therefore to still count as an internal disclosure, fail 
because it attempts to fix the boundaries of the organisation at that proxy.  From the analysis 
of complex systems undertaken in this chapter thus far we can say that such an understanding 
is unethical because it “disregards the complex, non-linear, asymmetrical interactions and 
interdependencies that exist between corporations and stakeholders … corporations have a 
duty to try and remain open and responsive to stakeholders concerns and environmental 
demands” (Woermann 2010a: 182).  
Remaining open and responsive to stakeholder concerns would entail that the designation 
„internal‟ or „external‟ to the organisation should be flexible and thus who qualifies as a 
recipient of a disclosure of wrongdoing remain flexible, dependant on what response is 
required to a particular stakeholder. To employ terminology from the ethics of Critical 
Complexity, we would say that a designation of „internal‟ or „external‟ to the organisation is 
provisional. One injunction of the Provisional Imperative was to “justify your actions only in 
ways that do not preclude the possibility of revising that justification” (Preiser and Cilliers 
2010: 275). So, as we have seen, the organisation will usually justify designating an internal 
disclosure procedure they expect the would-be whistleblower to follow, because it allows the 
organisation the opportunity to rectify that wrongdoing. But an ethical organisation, 
following the Provisional Imperative, would still allow - in the sense that it would still extend 
its protection mechanisms to the whistleblower - a disclosure that went against these 
procedures if there were reasons which justified that exception. Thus we have seen (Chapter 
1, Section 3.3) that the whistleblower who bypasses his immediate superior and goes to the 
board because his superior is the one involved in the wrongdoing, or because of the urgency 
of the matter, is justified.  
Keeping the designation „internal‟ or „external‟ to the organisation flexible and thus the status 
of who qualifies as a recipient of a disclosure of wrongdoing as flexible, would thus justify an 
„external‟ disclosure in violation of the organisation‟s procedures (whether that be a strictly 
„internal‟ disclosure or a tiered approach) not because of an overriding public interest 
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(although this reason should not be discounted either), but because in revising its justification 
- that it be given the opportunity to rectify the wrongdoing - the organisation acknowledges 
its responsibility as relational responsiveness. In other words, in permitting the „external‟ 
disclosure to stand (in this particular instance) it is acknowledging that that party ( the 
„outside‟ party the „external‟ disclosure was made to) is included in the considerations of the 
organisation; that the boundaries between the organisation and that „external‟ recipient are 
fluid and that they are open to one another. Part of the reason for that revision would be that 
only by acknowledging that particular „outside‟ party as included in the considerations of the 
organisation would the organisation be able to be accountable in the sense of acting to correct 
harm to someone. Disclosure to the „external‟ party in the instance allows the organisation to 
be relationally responsive because that „external‟ party has the resources to assist in stopping 
and/or correcting the harm emanating from the organisation.  
As an example consider the BP oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. By itself, it 
did not have the resources to either contain the spill quickly, or to mitigate the harm being 
done to both the wildlife and residents in the area. Only by allowing „external‟ parties such as 
environmental protection and wildlife groups, normally parties it would be quite antagonistic 
to, to become part of its response to the spill would it be able to ameliorate the harm done to 
the bird and sea-life and residents of the area, and thus to remain relationally responsive to 
those stakeholders.  
If BP had allowed more flexibility in designating who qualified as „internal‟ to its 
organisation in the first place and not “operate[d] as a self-contained entity that freely 
interact[ed] with stakeholders on its own terms” (Painter-Morland 2006: 90), then the spill 
might possibly have been avoided, but certainly the damage to the environment lessened. 
This is because disclosures to those stakeholders - the environmental protection and wildlife 
groups - would have allowed them to warn BP that continuation of those particular work 
practices (that eventually led to the spill and/or exacerbated the spill‟s harm) would threaten a 
specific harm whose interest they represented - say a particular species of fish. By taking 
cognisance of the possibility of this very specific harm, i.e. being relationally responsive to 
that species of fish, BP in reviewing those particular work practices may have discovered that 
in fact a more general harm was likely, and that those particular practices were rooted in 
more widespread organisational practices, thus necessitating a systemic overhaul. Thus by 
allowing flexibility in disclosure to that „external‟ stakeholder a major disaster may have 
been avoided. Such an outcome may strike some as overly optimistic but we should never 
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forget that in a complex system, such as the organisation, characteristics such as non-linearity 
mean that small causes can have large results.    
In order for the organisation to remain open, flexible and responsive to its stakeholders and 
environment it needs “planning as open systems” (Collier & Esteban 1999: 176).  Woermann 
(2010a: 182) describes this   
… [not as] a once-off organisational intervention [but] a process of continual re-
organisation in an effort to create greater flexibility. Greater flexibility allows 
organisational structures to become more loosely coupled, in order to better deal with 
current concerns such as globalisation, increased communication possibilities, 
technological change, financial innovation, freer trade possibilities, and heightened 
competition for market share. 
„Planning as open systems‟ would, inter alia, require continually reorganising the hierarchies 
of the organisation, which would impact on internal disclosures and tiered approaches which 
rely on hierarchical structures for them to be effective. These disclosures are either made to 
an immediate superior in the organisation, who then escalates it up the chain of command, or 
made to a series of proxies (regulators, Ombudspersons) arranged in a particular sequence. 
However, as we demonstrated (in Section 2.2 above) hierarchies understood as „nested‟ 
constrains the system such that complex behaviour becomes impossible. Hierarchies in an 
organisation understood as a complex system make escalation of a disclosure up a chain of 
command very difficult, because the „interpenetrativeness‟ of complex hierarchies make 
distinguishing which part of the system is subordinate to which very difficult. Recall King‟s 
(1999) empirical study (see also Chapter 1, Section 5) in which it was found that an 
organisation with numerous hierarchical levels may discourage internal disclosure, while 
clear and open communication channels enhances trust between superiors and subordinates, 
facilitating disclosure of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, complexity can still subvert these 
channels no matter how clear or open, because of feedback loops within the organisation. 
Hierarchies thus need to be continually transformed to ensure that the organisation remains 
open and flexible. This does not necessarily always entail their destruction; (as we saw in 
Section 2.2 above) a shift, changing an existing hierarchy into a different one, can be 
sufficient. Thus a particular hierarchy for an internal disclosure - superior, divisional 
manager, board member may be deemed unsuitable in particular circumstances and thus 
altered to - ethics officer, board member, regulator. Continually transforming hierarchies will 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
help ensure that the recipient one can disclose to remains flexible and responsive to the 
stakeholder affected by the disclosure. 
If Critical Complexity requires that the boundaries and hierarchies of the organisation should 
be fluid and provisional, then positing the question of whether internal or external disclosure 
should qualify as whistleblowing is thus ultimately futile. As such, the central dilemma of 
whistleblowing, whether the whistleblower owes his/her loyalty to the organisation or to 
society, also becomes rather less polarising. The basis of that dilemma also rests on a framing 
issue - the question of where the boundaries of business and society lie. As a segue to that 
bigger question, which we tackle in this chapter‟s penultimate section, we first consider how 
corporate member‟s framing of their corporate roles (as against how organisations frame their 
corporate boundaries) might impact upon their understanding of their corporate 
responsibilities. 
If corporate members perceive their boundaries too narrowly, they might underestimate the 
scope of their responsibilities with the result that they neither “recognise [nor] accept 
accountability towards stakeholders who are affected by their actions” (Woermann 2010a: 
185).  To illustrate this effect Woermann (184-5) cites a study by Frew (1973) in which 
employees of a corporation, notorious for its pollution, recognised and deplored the 
corporation‟s polluting activities, yet continued daily to contribute to the problem through 
their work practices.  Woermann attributes such schizophrenic behaviour to the way their 
work practices were delineated (185). The solution would be to widen the employees‟ 
corporate identities such that they also perceived themselves as belonging to the community 
affected by their polluting activities (even if they did not live in that community or have 
children who went to school in that community) and that “their work identities (which are 
formed through practice) cannot be incongruent with their community identities” (185). 
Let us restate the above solution: If the employees understood themselves, not just as 
employees of the polluting corporation but also as members of the affected community then 
their wrongdoing, polluting, would be rectified. Let us recall the last part of Jubb‟s (1999) 
definition of whistleblowing (see Chapter 1, Section 2): “disclosure… to an external entity 
having the potential to rectify the wrongdoing”. Thus if the whistleblower‟s disclosure results 
in his/her fellow  employees widening their corporate identities such that they become 
congruent with their community identities then that disclosure would (potentially) rectify the 
wrongdoing in the present case (in light of the above findings we can now say whether that 
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disclosure be an internal or external disclosure).  The disclosure by itself would not be 
sufficient for that congruence to take place. We can repeat (from Chapter 1, Section 6.2) 
Jones‟ et al. (2005: 121) warning: “Whistleblowing is only possible if there are people to hear 
the whistle being blown.”  What are the conditions then, which enable the corporate member 
to widen his/her corporate identity such that it is congruent with his/her community identity?  
5. The whistleblower as parrhesiastes: dissolving the boundaries between society and 
the organisation 
Business and ethics have always made uneasy bedfellows. Indeed, the accusation that the 
notion of „business ethics‟ is an oxymoron is both pervasive and persistent (Duska 2000). At 
this stage Milton Friedman (1970: 39) is usually invoked - “… there is one and only one 
social responsibility of business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits.” If this is indeed the case then the competitive nature of business being 
what it is, all corporations will reach a stage that the only way to increase profits is by 
harming someone else (Duska 2000: 113) - whether that be a group of employees that are 
made redundant, a community which loses tax revenues (because the corporation threatens to 
shift operations elsewhere if local taxation rates are not lowered), or a supplier who is 
overlooked because s/he sources only goods with the lowest possible carbon footprint, which 
naturally cost a bit more.  Eventually, says Duska this “bottom-line myopia … builds up a 
habitual single-minded view that has no room for justice when it conflicts with strategic 
profit-making” (113). According to this redundant, conventional view profits thus preclude 
ethics, or rather there is a boundary which surrounds business, within which ethics has no 
part to play.  That boundary is like the boundary of a game, a poker game if you will, and 
actions we would in society at large call deceitful - plain and simple lying - within the 
boundaries of business are simply called „bluffing‟ (Carr 1968). 
The increasing awareness of the detrimental impact of business on the environment as well as 
the social and economic costs of corporate failures such as Enron in the early 2000s has 
awakened many to the realisation that such strategy is no longer viable. Governments around 
the world have decided it needs to inject justice into the corporation and get it to focus not 
just on the bottom line of profits but on the triple bottom line of profit and society and the 
environment.
25
 To this end, legislative and regulatory interventions such as SOX in the USA 
                                                          
25
 The triple bottom line is a term coined by John Elkington(1999) He argues that business should not just 
concern itself with adding economic value ( profit), but also environmental (planet) and social (people) value.  
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and the King III Code (IoD 2010) on corporate governance in South Africa has required 
corporations to institute ethics programmes in their organisations. Part and parcel of these 
ethics programmes has been to institute an organisational whistleblowing policy (see Chapter 
1, Section 5 and Chapter 2, Section 4), which it was hoped would contribute to creating a 
more ethical organisation. Sadly, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, and the on-going 
debt crisis continuing in its wake has served to confirm our worst fears - ethics has become 
just one more operational risk to be managed, like allocating capital or fostering innovation. 
Friedman and Carr‟s ideologies are not just still with us, but apparently, still rude in health. 
Painter-Morland (2008) believes that the institutionalisation of ethics in corporate ethics 
programmes has failed to create a more ethical organisation because ethics has become 
dissociated from practice. Instead “ethics is portrayed as a set of principles that must be 
applied to business decisions” with the result that “ethics functions as a final hurdle in a 
deliberate decision-making process” (2008: 2). A rules-based approach assumes that ethics 
can be „taught‟ as a set of solutions to cover any and all problems that may arise in the course 
of undertaking business; a handbook that may be pulled out, in case of ethical emergency, 
and the relevant pages consulted for a fix-up. We observed how this rules-based approach, a 
method characteristic of the Enlightenment, failed to address satisfactorily ethical dilemmas 
in general (Chapter 2, Section 2) and whistleblowing dilemmas in particular.  
We need to recall that the counterpart to the parrhesiastes as truth-teller is the rhetor 
(Chapter 1, Section 6.2). The rhetor, we said, is one who merely tries to persuade. Persuade 
us of what? That the code of conduct rule 7.A.i does not apply to the case at hand because 
element X is absent? Persuade us that the whistleblower is ineligible to get compensation for 
his/her dismissal because s/he disclosed first to a senior executive in a different department 
rather than his/her immediate supervisor? Jones et al. (2005: 121) told us that rhetoric is a 
technique that can be learnt. Just like a set of ethical principles. The parrhesiastes however, 
who seeks to bear witness to truth, engages in a way of life (121). S/he engages in „ethics as 
practice‟.  As such, s/he cannot understand ethics “that is practised at arm‟s length” or as “an 
abstract cognitive exercise” but as an exhortation to “remain fully engaged with the concrete 
contingencies and dynamics of the world” (Painter-Morland 2008: 87).  “Ethics as practice is 
all about participation, relationships and responsiveness” (87).  
In living a life of parrhesia ethics becomes integrated into the identity of the parrhesiastes. 
When business enacts a similar integration ethics comes to inform corporate members‟ 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
92 
 
“perceptions of events from the start and plays an important part in shaping their responses” 
(Painter-Morland 2008: 2).  Understanding organisations as complex systems allows us to 
envisage how such integration is possible. Our examination, in Section 3.1 of this chapter, of 
how corporate identity is formed demonstrated that “ethics is not only something the 
organisation „does‟; the organisation is constituted through normative processes” (Cilliers 
2010: 16) (italics in original).  
At this point we should return to Vandekerckhove‟s analysis of the shift in the ethics of 
whistleblowing from one which saw it as a dilemma: the conflict between society and the 
organisation; to one in which that conflict was to be contained within the organisation (or a 
proxy of society) resulting in a paradox (Chapter 2, Section 4). The „network perspective‟ 
would maintain relevance in our sense-making of the globalisation semantic only if it could 
stabilise that semantic - i.e. could eliminate the conflict between the organisation and society. 
Our analysis in this chapter has attempted to demonstrate why Vandekerckhove‟s project 
failed: because he understands networks of organisations and organisations in society as 
closed systems. Such an understanding sees the formation of „society‟ as ontologically prior 
to the subsystems, such as organisations, that comprise society. This misunderstanding is 
analogous to the one which understood the identities of individuals as corporate members as 
ontologically prior to the identity of the corporation as a whole.  
If we understand identity formation as a complex phenomenon, as this thesis argues, then we 
must accept that the identity of society and organisations are coterminous. As such there can 
be no society versus organisation. Attempts to contain conflicts within an organisation, or 
society‟s proxies fail because the boundary between society and the organisation are 
permeable and fluid. The organisation has to remain open to society for it to survive and for it 
to be ethical:  it cannot survive if it is not ethical, because society cannot survive if it is not 
ethical. Ethical in the sense as Painter-Morland understands it - as responsiveness and 
relationships, not just to and with one another but to and with the environment and the planet.  
Returning to Vandekerckhove‟s characterisation of the globalisation semantic we can say that 
understanding society and organisations as complex systems (instead of autopoietic, closed 
systems) allows the concept of „network‟ to maintain relevance in our meaning making and 
so stabilises the globalisation semantic, i.e. eliminates the conflict between the organisation 
and society. Understanding identity formation in society and organisations as complex 
phenomenon also resolves Vandekerckhove‟s paradox identified at the end of Chapter 2: 
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Effective whistleblowing policies, which entail a broad scope in their actor, subject and 
recipient elements, need an organizational and societal „culture‟ characterized by the absence 
of abuse of power in highly independent and transparent organizations. However, to assume 
such a „culture‟ annuls the need for whistleblowing.  
A „broad scope‟ equates to an organisation planned as open systems. The paradox is 
overcome because if an organisation remains open to its stakeholders, it nonetheless still 
remains constrained and hence remains ethical, which precludes an abuse of power. 
Remaining open to its stakeholders ensures that the organisation remains „relationally 
responsive‟ to its stakeholders - annulling the need for whistleblowing.  
„Annulling‟ is perhaps the wrong formulation. There will always be a need for someone to 
raise concerns; and in order for those concerns to be taken seriously there will always be a 
need for the whistleblower. Concern that animals were being exposed to unnecessary levels 
of pain in order to test for the harmful effects of cosmetics on humans was initially limited 
and then downplayed (Singer 2009). Getting industry and the public to take those concerns 
seriously required the disclosure of the horrors of those experiments and the needless 
suffering they inflicted on the animals (52-61). Coupled with a growing animal welfare 
activism, (a tie-up strategy advocated by De Maria 2008; see chapter 1, Section 6.1) most 
corporations in the cosmetic industry no longer test their products on animals. There will thus 
always be disagreements about what constitutes harm and who counts as a stakeholder, but as 
described above, normative congruence allows the organisation to accommodate difference 
and dissensus while maintaining the “organisation‟s unity of purpose and sense of identity” 
(Painter-Morland 2008: 224).  
The whistleblower then, is not that person who stands in opposition to the organisation but is 
its very manifestation. In retaliating against the whistleblower, the organisation (uselessly) 
retaliates against itself.  The whistleblower as parrhesiastes becomes the collective social 
conscience of the organisation who represents the boundary, or limit, of acceptable 
transgression that will be tolerated by society in general, and a specific stakeholder in 
particular at any given point in time. Business should make profits, but profit is not an end in 
itself (Painter-Morland 2008: 291). Profits contribute to creating the environment in which 
the things we value, such as health and happiness, can be achieved. We need to be reminded 
of this so that in the legitimate pursuit of profit we do not inadvertently harm the very things 
we wish to safeguard and promote. The whistleblowing act, as an act of parrhesia, is thus an 
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act of loyalty to both the organisation and society simultaneously because such an act, as an 
act of relational responsiveness, ensures not just the continued survival, but the continued 
flourishing of both the organisation and society.  
6. Conclusion 
The pariah stands at the periphery of society. Critical Complexity shows us that “meaning is 
located at the periphery, rather than the core of a corporation” (Woermann 2010a: 187).  In 
representing the periphery of a corporation, the „outside‟ of society, the whistleblower 
becomes its meaning; Critical Complexity allows us to reconceptualise the whistleblower: 
from pariah to parrhesiastes. Critical Complexity also allows us to disband whistleblowing‟s 
essential aporia; one can be loyal to one‟s organisation and society at the same time.  To the 
classical way of thinking, as exemplified by the proponents of the Enlightenment ideal, this is 
a contradiction. And a contradiction reveals a flawed reasoning (Morin 2008: 45). However, 
from a complex view, a contradiction “points not to an error but rather to the fact that we 
have reached a deep layer of reality that, precisely because of its depth, cannot be translated 
into our logic” (45).   
This chapter commenced by describing the logic of Critical Complexity; how the boundaries 
of systems are both constraining and enabling. We examined the ethics of Critical 
Complexity which amounts to a provisional imperative to always and continuously revise our 
knowledge of complex systems because our framing strategies will always get something 
wrong. In Section 3 we demonstrated how using complexity‟s insights allowed an 
understanding of the identity of corporate members and the corporation as coterminous. 
Corporate purpose and identity was achieved, inter alia, through a process of normative 
congruence which allowed a conception of accountability as relational responsiveness. 
Relational responsiveness broadened our notion of responsibility to include stakeholders 
previously ignored. One way of achieving this is through corporate members widening their 
corporate identities to include a community identity. More importantly, it requires the 
organisation to plan as open systems which requires, inter alia, extending protection to the 
whistleblower even if an external disclosure has been made.  
Finally, in order for a broadening of corporate member‟s identities and the organisation‟s 
identity, such that responsibility as relational responsiveness can take place, a deeper and 
more profound reconceptualisation is required. If we take Critical Complexity‟s central 
insight regarding organisations seriously - that an organisation is constituted by its ethics - 
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then we must move away from business ethics as a set of rules to be followed and instead see 
business ethics as practice.  Only then will the whistleblower as parrhesiastes be seen as the 
organisation‟s saviour and not its failure.  
 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
 
Conclusion  
1. Summary of the argument 
This thesis commenced with an exploration of the ethics of whistleblowing as traditionally 
understood, describing the ethical dilemma at its centre - remaining loyal to one‟s 
organisation against alerting society to organisational wrongdoing that threatens its welfare. 
The positions on several problematic issues in the literature such as dissent, organisational 
retaliation, whistleblower motive and mandatory whistleblowing were presented and 
evaluated. The key internal/external disclosure dichotomy was also examined. The failure to 
achieve satisfactory resolutions to these issues, as well as whistleblowing‟s central dilemma, 
was attributed to the adoption of an Enlightenment rules-based approach to the ethics of 
whistleblowing. An Enlightenment rules-based approach seeks to posit universal and 
immutable ethical standards that transcend context.  
As corrective to the above failings, the ethics of whistleblowing was investigated from the 
view that saw it as a historically determined and culturally mediated social practice. Within 
the contexts of the USA and South Africa it was shown that key whistleblowing issues, and 
even the central whistleblowing dilemma of divided loyalties, cannot be cast in immutable 
and universal terms, and are influenced by the contingencies that accompany them.  
Understanding whistleblowing in the context of the globalisation of the last thirty years 
proved more difficult however. Vandekerckhove‟s project of seeking to place the normative 
legitimisations of whistleblowing legislation and organisational whistleblowing policies 
within a globalisation semantic, able to contain the conflict between society and the 
organisation, proved ill-conceived because of his particular understanding of the organisation 
as an autopoietic system, i.e. an operationally closed system. 
Moving the argument forward was undertaken at the hand of Critical Complexity theory, 
which made the case for understanding the organisation as an open system. This allowed us 
to recast corporate responsibility as relational responsiveness to a particular stakeholder, 
which in turn allowed us to see as flexible who qualifies as a legitimate recipient of a 
disclosure of wrongdoing. Consequently the internal/external disclosure dichotomy proved 
unsustainable. Further opening up the organisation rendered the boundary with society 
meaningless because the identity of society and organisation are inextricably tied together. As 
such the notion of society versus the organisation disappears and whistleblowing can be 
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reconceptualised as loyalty to both society and the organisation simultaneously, thus 
rendering the central dilemma of whistleblowing obsolete. 
2. Key ideas and insights  
In the introduction it was stated that one of the goals of this thesis was to provide a legitimate 
social identity for the whistleblower. Having argued that the identity of society and the 
organisation are coterminous, we can say that if we have succeeded in providing a legitimate 
social identity for the whistleblower then we have also succeeded in providing a legitimate 
organisational (corporate) identity for the whistleblower. Conventionally the whistleblower is 
either scorned or praised, labelled either a saint or a snitch; polar attitudes that reflects the 
central dilemma of whistleblowing. What both, opposing, attitudes betray is a belief that the 
whistleblower is an anomaly, someone who does not and cannot fit into the organisation.  
However, this thesis argues that the whistleblower is firmly part of the organisation, indeed 
fundamentally part of the organisation. The whistleblower is no longer seen as a boundary-
violator, and hence a pariah, but the very boundary of the organisation.  
The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes is more specifically the ethical boundary of the 
organisation who represents the limit of acceptable transgression that will be tolerated by 
society in general, or a specific stakeholder in particular, at any given point in time. All 
business activity, by its very nature disrupts and thus has the potential to harm, but as a 
collective, society decides what trade-offs are necessary in that process. The whistleblower-
as-parrhesiastes synthesises dissent within the organisation, particularly dissent over what 
constitutes potential harm to society or a particular stakeholder and who needs to be informed 
about that potential harm. As such the whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes represents society‟s 
on-going debate concerning the just trade-off between business activity and societal welfare.  
The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes thus embodies the process of normative congruence 
which allows the organisation to accommodate difference and dissensus, while maintaining 
the “organisation‟s unity of purpose and sense of identity”, an identity, to repeat once again, 
that is coterminous with the identity of society. 
The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes, as the ethical boundary of the organisation, is what 
allows the organisation to remain an open system. The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes is 
what allows the organisation to keep the demarcation of its boundaries flexible and thus to 
remain relationally responsive to its stakeholders. The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes allows 
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us to render the internal/external disclosure dichotomy void because s/he demands that who 
qualifies as a legitimate recipient of a disclosure of wrongdoing remains flexible, dependent 
on what response is required to a particular stakeholder. 
The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes embodies ethics as practice within the organisation, 
which ensures that normative questions come to inform organisations‟ “perceptions of events 
from the start and plays an important part in shaping their responses” (Painter-Morland 2008: 
2). Only if such normative questions are asked, from the beginning, will the organisation be 
able to remain relationally responsive. Furthermore the answers to those questions should 
always remain provisional, subject to the evolving needs of stakeholders and the challenges 
presented by a globalised and information-technology driven society, an increasingly 
complex society. The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes serves as a constant reminder to the 
organisation of that provisionality, thus ensuring that the boundaries between the organisation 
and society remain open, fluid and flexible.  
Returning once again to the ambivalence that has thus far characterised our attitudes towards 
whistleblowers - saint or snitch, hero or traitor - we are now in a position to agree with Alford 
(2001: 34) when he says that: “It is not the acts of heroes that will save the republic. It is the 
acts of citizens, men and women who remember the public when they are acting in private.” 
The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes is that citizen, or rather, that employee who remembers 
that as a citizen one has duties towards the public that cannot be checked at the door of the 
organisation. The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes ensures that the organisation contributes to 
the political struggles contested in society, and in turn embraces the political victories won by 
different segments of society.  The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes guards against Alford‟s 
fear that “the associations that make up civil society will have the quality of a hobby” (35), 
because the whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes ensures that there is “ethical commerce between 
the organisation and civil society” (35). The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes, particularly in 
South Africa‟s young and fragile democracy, ensures that the institutions of civil society are 
strengthened, which in turn ensures that the whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes goes from 
strength to strength within the organisation.  
When discussing whistleblower motives in Chapter 1 we saw that the notion of „narcissism 
moralized‟, which postulated that “Whistleblowers [are] loyal not to principles but to ideal 
selves who embody those principles” (Alford 2001: 84), was too stringent an ethical standard 
for most to follow.  It was argued that this idealism helps explain why the whistleblower is 
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cast as a pariah - the whistleblower may come across as self-righteous, revealing the timidity 
and/or hypocrisy of his/her colleagues, forcing upon them a questioning of their own values 
and norms. It is not that the whistleblower‟s colleagues do not have values or norms but, 
rather that the organisation can create a culture of moral silence in which there is no outlet to 
express those values. This moral muteness, says (Bird 1996: 7):    
often has the effect of dampening our moral convictions. [However] when people 
speak up for their convictions, these commitments at the same time tend to become 
more articulate, clearer, and stronger. Hence we would expect that the range and 
strength of our moral convictions would become wider and stronger as we find ways 
of voicing them.  
The whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes spearheads finding new ways of voicing moral 
convictions within the organisation because s/he ensures that the organisation remains open 
to society in general, and relationally responsive to its stakeholders in particular. As such the 
whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes is not one that should inspire shame in those who choose not 
to „speak-up‟, but rather serve as motivation to those who “speak only with a whisper” (Bird 
1996: 42), or not at all.   
Alford (2001:3 5) remarked that “the fate of the whistleblower is not the worst problem our 
society faces, but it illuminates many others.” One such problem, it was shown, is the 
separation of ethics from business, which silences ethical discourse within the organisation. 
Alford (36) issues a stark warning: “ If everyone has to hide in order to say anything of 
ethical consequence, then we will all end our days as drivers on a vast freeway: darkened 
windshields, darkened license plate holders, dark glasses, speeding aggressively to God 
knows where.”  Reconceptualising the whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes shines a light not only 
on what the organisation does or does not do, but more importantly a light on the values of 
our society. In embracing the whistleblower-as-parrhesiastes we may in time come to see 
more clearly where we, as society, are going.  
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